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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the final agency action pursuant to U.C.A.
§§ 63-46b-16(l) and 78-2a-3(2)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether the decision of the Division of Health Care Financing to deny
reimbursement for lack of prior authorization is contrary to law and prior practice, is an
abuse of discretion, and is otherwise arbitrary and capricious.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State
Tax Comm7i, 811 P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah 1991).
Record of Issue: Raised and decided in agency hearing. (Transcript of Hearing of
Aug. 12, 1998, hereafter "Tr.," at 21, 29; Recommended Decision, hereafter "Rec. Dec,"
R. 115, 117.)
2. Whether the agency decision to deny retroactive authorization for the
transplant is contrary to law and prior agency practice, is an abuse of discretion, or is
otherwise arbitrary and capricious.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Pickett v. Utah Dept. of Commerce,
858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993); Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah
App. 1991).
Record of Issue: Raised and decided in agency hearing. (Tr. 69-70; Rec. Dec, R.
117.)
3. Whether the Division of Health Care Financing is equitably estopped to require
prior authorization, based on its initial misrepresentations that the patient was not

Medicaid eligible and its prior practice of notifying the Hospital of eligibility
determinations.
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm yn, 864
P.2d 904, 908-09 (Utah App. 1993); Savage Industries, Inc., supra.
Record of Issue: Raised and decided in agency hearing. (Tr. 101; Rec. Dec, R.
117-19.)
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
This Court's review of the agency action is governed by U.C.A. § 63-46b-16. The
substantive standards for reimbursement of the transplant costs are set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1396d(a)(4)(B) and (r)(5); U.C.A. §§ 26-18-2.3 and -3; and Utah Admin. Code
R414-1-22 and -25(6), R410-14-2(1)0), R414-10A-4(5), R414-10A-6, R414-10A-9
(1997), all set forth verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 29-57.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an administrative action by Primary Children's Hospital for reimbursement
of the $250,000-cost of a bone marrow transplant performed on a 5-year-old Medicaid
patient, Sean Daugaard. (R. 2-3, 64, 93.) The medical necessity of the procedure, the
appropriateness of care, and the Medicaid eligibility of Sean Daugaard are not in dispute.
The Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing ("DHCF" or
"Agency")* denied the request for reimbursement on the sole basis that the Hospital did
not obtain prior authorization for the services. (R. 75.) However, the Hospital
demonstrated at the administrative hearing that the Agency's own employee precluded
2

prior authorization by erroneously advising the Hospital that Sean Daugaard was not
Medicaid eligible, and by failing to notify the Hospital of Sean's corrected status that
same day. Moreover, the DHCF deviated from its prior practice of granting retroactive
authorization for medically necessary and appropriate services. The Hospital also
demonstrated that reimbursement is required under principles of equitable estoppel. (Tr.
13, 21-22, 69-70, 95-101.) The DHCF presented no opposing testimony. However, the
Administrative Law Judge recommended that denial of reimbursement be affirmed, and
the Agency director adopted that recommendation in his Final Agency Order. (R. 11319, Add. 1-7.) The Hospital petitioned for this Court's review of that Agency action. (R.
125.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In March 1997, five-year-old Sean Daugaard was admitted to Primary Children's
Hospital for testing and treatment for suspected leukemia. A bone marrow biopsy
confirmed a diagnosis of Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia, a cancer of the white blood
cells that destroys the immune system. The testing lab described Sean's case as
"extremely difficult." (Pet. Exh. 1, pp. 9, 22, following R. 51, Add. 11-13.)
Chemotherapy was commenced immediately, but symptoms persisted, and treatment was
complicated by infectious diseases. Sean's treating physician, Dr. Roberta H. Adams,
Director of Pediatric Blood and Marrow Transplant, concluded that a bone marrow
transplant was necessary to save Sean's life. (Id., p. 26, Add. 14-15.) Dr. Carol
Bruggers, Assistant Professor of Pediatrics, also concluded "to pursue bone marrow
3

transplantation as definitive therapy." (Id., p. 27, Add. 16.) Search for a bone marrow
match commenced, and Sean was scheduled to undergo the procedure as soon as the
infectious diseases resolved and his blood counts sufficiently recovered. (Id., pp. 25-28,
Add. 14-17.) However, Sean's parents, while accepting the need for a transplant, were
"stressed" over insurance questions and "overwhelmed" with the financial requirements
to meet Sean's medical needs. (Id., pp. 3, 26, Add. 9, 15.)
Richard Fairborn, the Hospital's Resource Counselor, met with the Daugaards in
March, at the time of the testing and diagnosis, to discuss available resources and
funding options. He concluded that the family did not have sufficient means to pay for
the services, and that they would be eligible for Medicaid coverage. Medicaid eligibility
was established, and Medicaid covered the diagnostic and treatment services provided in
the months prior to the bone marrow transplant. (Tr. 19-21, 35-36.) DHCF records
show that Sean's Medicaid coverage was approved June 9, 1997, retroactive to March 1,
1997. (Resp. Exh. 10-1, 10-4, 10-5, 10-6, 10-8, R. 102, 105-07, 110, Add. 23-28.)
Sean was admitted to the Hospital for his bone marrow transplant on July 8, 1997.
After a period of observation and testing, he was scheduled to undergo several days of
pre-transplant conditioning therapy, in which diseased marrow is destroyed by radiation
and drugs before the new marrow is actually injected. (Pet. Exh. 1, pp. 26, 28, Add. 1517; Tr. 11, 19.) On July 9, before the conditioning therapy had begun, Richard Fairborn
checked the computer database of the DHCF to verify Sean's Medicaid eligibility before
submitting the request for prior authorization that was required for Medicaid coverage of
4

the transplant. He was surprised to see that the system showed Sean as no longer
Medicaid eligible. Mr. Fairborn immediately went to Debbie Lucero, the Medicaid
eligibility officer for DHCF, who had an office right in the Hospital for the convenience
of Hospital patients and staff. Mr. Fairborn asked Ms. Lucero why Sean appeared to be
ineligible for Medicaid coverage, when he had been eligible for the past several months.
Ms. Lucero confirmed that Sean was no longer eligible, and that no Medicaid card had
been sent to the Daugaard family in July because their status was under review. She
advised Mr. Fairborn that a new application would have to be submitted for the family in
order to reestablish their Medicaid eligibility. In compliance with those instructions, Mr.
Fairborn immediately went to Sean's room and had Mrs. Daugaard complete a new
Medicaid application, which Mr. Fairborn then personally delivered to Ms. Lucero that
same day. (Tr. 20-22, 25-28; Resp. Exh. 10-6, showing "no card for July 97," R. 107,
Add. 27.)
Mr. Fairborn noted on his own computer record for July 9 that the Daugaard
Medicaid application was pending with Debbie Lucero, and then waited for her response.
Ms. Lucero had routinely provided Mr. Fairborn with immediate personal notification of
eligibility determinations on pending cases. However, Ms. Lucero never did act on the
application or respond to Mr. Fairborn in this case. Instead, later on July 9, Ms. Lucero
unilaterally concluded that the Daugaards' eligibility was unchanged and simply
authorized issuance of a Medicaid card for July 1997, resuming the unbroken coverage
from March 1. (Tr. 25-30, 58-60, 91; Pet. Exh. 3, R. 54, Add. 18; Resp. Exh. 10-1
5

(showing case action on July 9), 10-6 (showing authorization of July card on July 9), 108 (showing mailing of card July 10, 1997), R. 102, 107, 110, Add. 23, 27-28.)
Meanwhile, without knowing that Sean's Medicaid eligibility had been reinstated, the
Hospital could not submit a request for prior authorization of his transplant. Medicaid
eligibility must precede a request for Medicaid coverage. However, given the gravity of
Sean's condition, the Hospital proceeded with Sean's treatment and transplant, with the
expectation of obtaining retroactive authorization and reimbursement once Sean's
Medicaid eligibility was reestablished. This expectation was based on DHCF's prior
practice of granting retroactive authorization in such cases, when Medicaid eligibility
could not be established prior to the date of service. (Tr. 68-70.) Sean's bone marrow
transplant procedure was successfully completed on July 17, 1997. (Resp. Exh. 3, R.
63, Add. 21.) 1
The Hospital did not learn that Sean's Medicaid eligibility had been reestablished
until August 1, 1997, when Mr. Fairborn was conducting a routine review of his pending
cases. At that time, the DHCF Medicaid database showed that Sean had been eligible for
all of July 1997, with no break in coverage. Mr. Fairborn noted that fact in his own
computer file. (Tr. 23, 28-30, 37-38, 49-50, 57-60; Pet. Exh. 4, R. 55, Add. 19.) Mr.

The Administrative Law Judge erroneously found that Debbie Lucero mailed a letter to the
Daugaards on July 9 confirming their eligibility status. (Rec. Dec, Finding No. 10, R. 116, Add. 4.)
Respondent's Exhibit 10-4, cited by the ALJ, is the original eligibility confirmation letter of June 9,
acknowledging Medicaid coverage from March 1. (R. 105, Add. 24.) No new eligibility letter was
mailed on July 9. Based on the Agency's position that Sean's Medicaid eligibility was unbroken
throughout his hospital stay, no new eligibility letter was necessary.
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Fairborn then asked Debbie Lucero and her successor why the DHCF database had
shown Sean as ineligible on July 9, but currently showed unbroken coverage from March
1 to the present. They explained that it was due to a "rollover" in the computer data, and
that the computer simply needed to be updated on July 9 to show continuing eligibility.
(Tr. 30-31, 46, 58-59.)
Sean remained in the Hospital for observation, to allow his immune system to
recover, until September 19, 1997. (Resp. Exh. 3, R. 63, Add. 21.) On that same day,
the Hospital prepared its request for retroactive authorization and reimbursement for
Sean's bone marrow transplant. (Resp. Exh. 4, R. 64, Add. 22.) The DHCF Case
Summary log shows receipt of this "request for retro-pa[y] for transplant." (Pet. Exh. 5,
R. 58, Add. 20.) That same log, in a note dated 11/14/97, recommends denial of
reimbursement based on several listed regulations, all of which pertain to medical
documentation supporting the transplant, and none of which pertains to prior
authorization of the transplant. (Id.; Regulations, Resp. Exh. 9, R. 77, 79-82.) The
DHCF issued a written denial of reimbursement, dated December 24, 1997, based on
"Lack of Substantiation of Medicaid Criteria." (Resp. Exh. 5, R. 65.) The Hospital
responded with a request for hearing, attaching a letter from Sean's physician, Dr.
Adams, demonstrating that all required supporting medical documentation had been
provided. (R. 1-3.) The DHCF initially denied the request for hearing as untimely, even
though the request was patently within the 30-day time limit, but then issued an amended
denial of reimbursement, adding lack of prior authorization as a reason. (R. 16,27.) The
7

Hospital submitted another request for hearing, which was granted and ultimately
scheduled for August 12, 1998. (R. 25, 42.) However, on July 23, 1998, just three
weeks before the hearing, the DHCF issued a second amended denial of reimbursement,
this time dropping all medical grounds for denial and listing only the lack of prior
authorization. (Resp. Exh. 8, R. 75.)
At the administrative hearing, the Hospital demonstrated, through the testimony of
Richard Fairborn, that the Hospital was precluded from obtaining prior authorization by
the misinformation from Debbie Lucero that Sean was not Medicaid eligible. The
Hospital also demonstrated, through Sean's medical records and the testimony of
Bernadette McNally, Transplant Program Coordinator, that the Hospital proceeded with
Sean's transplant out of medical necessity, to save his life, and with the reasonable
expectation of reimbursement, based on prior DHCF practice. The DHCF responded
with absolutely no opposing testimony. Counsel for the DHCF simply produced the data
from the Agency computer system (Resp. Exh. 10, Add. 23-28), without any advance
notice or production, ' 'testified11 himself regarding the content of the documents, over the
pleas of Hospital counsel that he at least be placed under oath, and then rested his case.
(Tr. 43-56.) DHCF counsel simply argued that because Sean was, in fact, Medicaid
eligible at all times, the Hospital should have known his true status and obtained prior
authorization. (Tr. 92-94.) The administrative law judge("ALJ"), an employee of the
Department of Health, accepted that reasoning in recommending that denial of
reimbursement be affirmed. (R. 115, Add. 3.) The Director of DHCF adopted the
8

recommended decision, without further analysis, as the Final Agency Order. (R. 113,
Add. 1.) The Hospital seeks judicial review of that order. (R. 125.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Federal law mandates Medicaid coverage of transplants for eligible minor
patients. Lack of prior authorization is not a valid basis to deny Medicaid payment for
transplantation services that are medically necessary and appropriate. No statute or rule
authorizes withholding payment for necessary and appropriate services based on lack of
prior authorization.
The Agency waived, or the Hospital should be deemed to have satisfied, prior
authorization because the Agency's own misrepresentations regarding Sean's eligibility
status prevented the Hospital from obtaining prior authorization. Equity and justice
entitle the Hospital to relief when the Agency's own conduct precluded prior
authorization.
The Agency had a legal duty to correct its prior misinformation or to inform the
Hospital of Sean's corrected status in order to permit prior authorization. The Agency's
failure to so notify the Hospital was an unjustified departure from prior Agency practice.
The Hospital had no duty to presume or discover the Agency's error in order to obtain
prior authorization. The Agency made no findings of fact, and there is no evidence, to
support the conclusion of law that the Hospital should have known of Sean's true
eligibility status.
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The Agency's denial of retroactive authorization is contrary to prior practice, is
without support in the findings and evidence, is an abuse of discretion, and is otherwise
arbitrary and capricious. The Agency's own rules and practice provide for retroactive
authorization in cases such as the present. The Agency's conclusion that this case does
not present "unusual circumstances," to justify application of the prior authorization
exception, is unsupported by the findings and the evidence.
The Agency is equitably estopped to deny payment in this case because the
Hospital reasonably relied on Agency representations that Sean was not Medicaid
eligible, and to allow the Agency to now take the position that the Hospital should have
known of Sean's continuous eligibility produces a serious injury and injustice to the
Hospital. The Agency's conclusion that this case is not of "sufficient gravity" to apply
equitable estoppel is not supported by the findings or the evidence.
ARGUMENT
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program providing medical assistance to eligible
low-income individuals and families. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 and 1396a-v (1998 Supp.).
The objective of Medicaid is to enable each state "to furnish medical assistance to
individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical services." Peterson v. Utah Dept. of Health, 969 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1998),
quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977). Participating states must establish a
Medicaid plan that complies with all federal statutes and regulations. The state plan must
provide reasonable standards and procedures for coverage of specified medical services.
10

Id; Greenstein v. Bane, 833 F. Supp. 1054, 1060 (D.N.Y. 1993). Generally, Medicaid
payments are made by the state directly to the entity providing the service rather than to
the recipient of the service. The purpose of this "vendor payment principle is to ensure
that providers will be reimbursed for services they furnish recipients, thereby eliminating
disincentives in providing such services based on the fear of nonpayment." Greenstein,
supra, at 1060. The federal government reimburses the state for a specified percentage
of the funds expended on the covered services. Peterson, supra, at 5. See generally
Bleazardv. UtahDept of Health, 861 P.2d 1048, 1049-51 (Utah App. 1993); Allen v.
Department of Health, 829 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1992), affd, 850 P.2d 1267 (Utah
1993).
Utah participates in the Medicaid program through its own Medical Assistance
Act. U.C.A. §§ 26-18-1 etseq. The Division of Health Care Financing is authorized to
administer the state program and is required to adopt implementing policy in
conformance with applicable federal law. 26-18-2.1, 26-18-3(2). The DHCF is required
to ensure that Medicaid services are necessary and appropriate, and that high quality care
is provided to recipients in the most cost-effective manner possible. 26-18-2.3(1).
General provisions of the state Medicaid plan are found in the Utah Administrative Code
*tBA\4-l etseq. (Add. 47.)
The federal Medicaid statute identifies seven different categories of services that a
state plan must provide to eligible individuals. See42U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A). These
services include, but are not limited to, inpatient hospital services, nursing services,
11

physician services, and early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment
("EPSDT") services for qualified recipients under age twenty-one. See 42 U.S.C. §
1396d(a)(l)-(5). The term EPSDT services is defined to include "[s]uch other necessary
health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures described in subsection (a)
of this section to correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and
conditions discovered by the screening services, whether or not such services are
covered under the State plan" 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) (emp. added) (Add. 37). This
provision has been interpreted to mandate Medicaid coverage for all medically necessary
treatment for eligible recipients under age twenty-one, including organ and bone marrow
transplants. See Pittman v. Secretary, Florida DHRS, 998 F.2d 887, 889, 892 (11 th Cir.),
cert, den., 114 S. Ct. 650 (1993) (requiring payment for minor's liver-bowel transplant);
Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723, 725 (4 th Cir. 1993) (requiring payment for minor's
heart transplant); McLaughlin v. Williams, 801 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D. Fla. 1992).
Moreover, transplantation services and coverage must be provided without
discrimination among similarly situated individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(l).
The state Medicaid plan also mandates coverage of EPSDT services, including
transplantation services, for eligible individuals under age twenty-one. R414-l-6(2)(e);
R414-10A-4(1) and -5(1). Consistent with federal requirements, these services must be
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provided without discrimination among similarly situated recipients. U.C.A. § 26-183(2); Rule R414-1-5.2
POINT I:

A.

THE AGENCY DECISION TO DENY REIMBURSEMENT FOR
LACK OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AND PRIOR PRACTICE, IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND IS
OTHERWISE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

Lack of Prior Authorization Is Not A Valid Basis to Withhold Payment.
The Agency's second amended notice of denial, dated July 23, 1998, is based

solely on lack of prior authorization, citing R414-10A-6(1). (R. 75.) That provision
states only that "[p]rior authorization is required for all transplantation services," with
exceptions not relevant here. However, that rule has never been applied by the Agency
to withhold reimbursement for "reasonable and necessary" services to an eligible
recipient. In fact, as noted, lack of prior authorization was not even considered as a basis
to deny payment in the Agency's initial decision. Because the service is mandated by
federal law, Pittman, supra, the Agency has no discretion to deny payment for admittedly
appropriate services.
The stated purpose of prior authorization is to verify that services are "reasonable
and necessary." See U.C.A. § 26-18-2.3(2)(a). Stated otherwise, prior authorization

2

Rule R414-10A-1(3) characterizes transplantation services as discretionary, citing an unreported
federal case, McDaniel v. Be tit, Case No. 96405 (D. Utah 1996). However, this interpretation of 42
U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5) is contrary to that of the federal cases cited in the text, and this Court is not bound
by the McDaniel court's interpretation of federal law. Modern Supply Co. v. Federal Savings & Loan
Ins. Corp., 748 P.2d 251, 254 (Wash. App. 1987) (when lower federal courts are divided on the
interpretation of a federal statute, state courts are free to decide the question for themselves). In any
event, the Agency in the present case does not dispute that the state Medicaid plan covers transplantation
services; therefore, the Agency is bound to ensure that coverage is uniform among all eligible recipients.
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helps ensure that Medicaid resources are properly utilized for appropriate services. See
Laddv. Thomas, 962 F. Supp. 284, 294 (D. Conn. 1997). Consistent with that purpose,
the statute defining DHCF duties provides that the Agency may deny a provider's claim
only when the services rendered "fail to meet criteria established by the division
concerning medical necessity or appropriateness.'" 26-18-2.3(1) (emp. added). Neither
the statutes nor the regulations authorize withholding payment for lack of prior
authorization alone, once medical necessity and appropriateness are satisfied. In fact,
Rule R414-l-25(6) states that "prior authorization must not be used as a substitute for
regulatory practice that should be in rule." (Add. 51.) In the absence of a rule, providers
are still motivated to obtain prior authorization because, without it, they assume the risk
that services provided may subsequently be found unnecessary or inappropriate, and
payment be denied for that reason, not for lack of prior authorization itself Accordingly,
in a case like the present, where medical necessity and appropriateness of care are
conceded, and the recipient's eligibility is unquestioned, lack of prior authorization is not
a valid or permissible basis to deny coverage.
B.

The Agency's Misrepresentation Effected A Waiver of Prior Authorization.
In any event, the Agency should be deemed to have waived the prior authorization

requirement because its own misinformation prevented compliance. Debbie Lucero's
statement to Richard Fairborn on July 9 that Sean was not Medicaid eligible prevented
the Hospital from obtaining prior authorization. The prior authorization form could not
be submitted until after eligibility was established. (Tr. 68-70.) If Ms. Lucero had
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correctly explained, as she did on August 1, that Sean's eligibility status was unchanged
and simply had to be updated in the computer, the Hospital could easily have submitted
the prior authorization form on July 9. Alternatively, if Ms. Lucero, consistent with her
prior practice, had simply notified Mr. Fairbom of her internal computer up-date on July
9, to show Sean's continuing eligible status, the Hospital could have submitted the
required form that same day. Either way, with correct information, the simple form could
have been faxed to the Agency that same day, with the detailed supporting
documentation to be submitted later. (Tr. 93-94.) See Rule R414-10A-6(2).3
On these unusual facts, the few similar cases that could be found support payment
for the service rendered. For example, in Society of the New York Hospital v. Mogensen,
319 N.Y.S.2d 258 (Misc. 1971), revyd and modified on other grounds, 373 N.Y.S.2d 722
(App. 1972), the hospital provided medical services to a financially needy patient, but
failed to submit a timely request for Medicaid reimbursement because the hospital was
not informed of the patient's Medicaid eligible status until after the time for submission
had expired. The court held that the hospital was entitled to reimbursement because the
patient was admittedly approved for Medicaid coverage, the state could still obtain
reimbursement from the federal government, and the time limit for submission of
provider claims must be read to presume provider knowledge of patient eligibility. Id. at

3

The Agency takes the position that the prior authorization form could have been submitted at any
time up to the actual bone marrow injection on July 17. (Tr. 92-93.) Under that assumption, Ms. Lucero
actually had another week from July 9 to correct her misinformation, but she failed to do so, leaving the
Hospital with the misunderstanding that Sean was still ineligible.
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261-62. The court reasoned that "[t]he department cannot be permitted to hide behind
these defenses under the fact pattern herein," and that "[t]he court has an obligation to
protect the recipient herein, and must slice through the bureaucracy to insure that
payment is made to the innocent vendor." Id. at 262-63. The same reasoning and
conclusion are even more compelling in the present, where the Agency's own employee
mislead the Hospital as to the recipient's true eligibility status.
Similarly, in In re Nemis, 351 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976), a nursing home's
claim for Medicaid reimbursement was denied because the claim was not timely
submitted with an authorization form from the agency. The nursing home demonstrated
that the agency had failed to provide the authorization form when requested, but the
agency responded that the nursing home knew of the patient's eligible status and should
have obtained the form sooner. The court held that because the purpose of the
procedural rules was to screen invalid claims, and there was no dispute as to the patient's
eligibility or the propriety of services rendered, the claim should not be denied for
technical noncompliance with "procedural niceties." Id. at 366. The court reasoned that
"considerations of equity and justice demand" payment:
We cannot affirm a result which glorifies form and procedure so as to deny
recovery for an admittedly legitimate claim. The confusion created in this
case by a combination of factors involving dereliction by a subordinate
agency in failing to submit [the requested] form and the misleading nature
of the many directives . . . of the Division, are adequate reasons for
invoking the exception contemplated by [the rules]. And this result should
follow despite the contributory neglect of the Home and its personnel. [Id.]
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The court concluded that "strict application of the rule to the factual pattern in this case
was an abuse of the discretionary power of the Division, whether tested by its own rules
or the principles of equity applied by the court." Id. at 367.
In the present case, as well, the Agency's own misinformation created "confusion"
as to the patient's Medicaid status, precluding technical compliance with the prior
authorization rule. Where there is no dispute as to patient eligibility or appropriateness
of services, the purpose of the prior authorization rule is not served by denying payment
for those services. Due to the Agency's own action in misleading the Hospital as to the
patient's true eligibility status, equity and justice require that the Agency be deemed to
have waived, or be precluded from relying on, the prior authorization requirement.
Denial of payment was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion.
C.

Nondisclosure of Sean's True Status Was Contrary to Prior Agency Practice.
The Agency denied payment under the rationale that Ms. Lucero had no duty to

inform the Hospital of Sean's corrected eligibility status, "although that had been her
custom," and that the Hospital "was not diligent" in tracking Sean's status. (Rec. Concl.
of Law No. 1, Add. 5.) However, this conclusion is contrary to law on both points.
1. Agency Duty. The Administrative Procedures Act, section 63 -46b16(4)(h)(iii), "clearly and unambiguously requires consistency of agency action in the
absence of an adequate rationale for departure from prior action." Pickett v. Utah Dept
of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993). Federal law also requires that
Medicaid assistance be provided on a uniform basis, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B),
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particularly with respect to transplantation services, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(l). The
Hospital presented evidence that Debbie Lucero routinely notified Mr. Fairborn of
changes in eligibility status. Mr. Fairborn testified of his expectation following
submission of the new application to Debbie Lucero on July 9:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Did you expect or have you ever had Debbie contact you in the
interim and let you know that a patient has become Medicaideligible?
Routinely she will come and let us know about eligibility, yes.
Did she contact you on this one?
No.
At any time?
No.
Okay. Was that a surprise to you?
Yes.
And why is that?
Because we do work together routinely on these cases and it would
have—it was out of the ordinary, especially where she knew we had
an interest in this one and the magnitude of it. [Tr. 29.]

The Agency provided no contrary evidence and no evidence demonstrating any rationale
for departure from prior practice.
On the basis of the undisputed evidence, the ALJ found the following fact No. 13:
"Debbie Lucero normally informed Mr. Fairbom when cases become eligible. Although
Ms. Lucero knew this case involved a large amount of money, she failed to inform Mr.
Fairborn of Sean's eligibility." (Add. 5.) As noted, the ALJ also concluded, as a matter
of law, that keeping the Hospital "apprised of new eligibility approvals . . . had been
[Ms. Lucero's] custom." (Id.) Accordingly, under the law requiring "consistency of
agency action," Pickett, supra, the Agency did have a legal duty to notify the Hospital of
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Sean's corrected eligibility status. That duty was even more imperative in light of Ms.
Lucero's prior representation that Sean was not eligible and that reinstatement of
eligibility required action on a new application. When Ms. Lucero unilaterally updated
Sean's eligibility status on July 9, without formal action on the new application, she had
an affirmative duty to correct her prior misinformation to Mr. Fairborn. The result of her
failure was to treat Sean differently from other similarly situated recipients, precluding
payment for his case when similar cases would be covered. See also Greenstein v. Bane,
833 F. Supp. 1054, 1071-73 (D.N.Y. 1993) (violation of Medicaid comparability
provisions through inconsistent application of agency standards "lacks rationality and is
arbitrary").4
2. Hospital Diligence. In view of the Agency's duty to notify the Hospital of
Sean's corrected eligibility status, the Hospital cannot be denied payment because of
supposed "lack of diligence" in discovering the Agency's error for itself. The Agency's
conclusion that the Hospital lacked diligence in discovering Sean's corrected status is
presumably based on the arguments of Agency counsel that the DHCF updated its
computer on July 9 to show unbroken coverage, that DHCF sent an eligibility letter to
Daugaard's on June 9, and that a new Medicaid card was mailed to Daugaard's on July

4

Even in the absence of a prior pattern of Agency conduct, the Agency had a duty under due process
principles to notify the Hospital of Sean's corrected eligibility status. See, e.g., Laddv. Thomas, 962 F.
Supp. 284, 289-90 (D. Conn. 1997) (agency duty to notify provider of action or inaction on request for
prior authorization); Dodson v. Parham, All F. Supp. 97, 109-11 (D. Ga. 1977) (agency duty to provide
notice of action on prior approval of payment for Medicaid drugs).
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10. (Tr. 14-15,34-37,42-48,91-94.) However, the Agency's conclusion is not
supported by the evidence or the findings.
The only evidence presented by the Agency to support lack of diligence by the
Hospital was presented in the form of document-interpretation and argument by Agency
counsel. However, arguments and opinions of counsel do not constitute admissible
evidence. Green v. American Pharmaceutical Co., 960 P.2d 912, 918 n.8 (Wash. 1998)
(party submitting no opposing testimony cannot rely on counsel's arguments and
interpretation of documents as evidence); Wilson v. Williams, 933 P.2d 757, 761 (Kan.
1997) (opening and closing arguments of counsel are not evidence). The Agency's own
rules require that all testimony be taken under oath, and that Agency findings cannot be
based solely on hearsay evidence. Rule R410-14-2(l)(j)(vii)(C) and (E) (Add. 44.) The
Agency produced no witnesses of its own, and Agency counsel simply "testified" himself
regarding the interpretation of computer entries based on his own supposed experience as
an Agency eligibility worker. (Tr. 45.) At different points in the hearing, the only
"evidence" was presented in the form of a colloquy between the ALJ and Agency
counsel regarding the interpretation of computer documents that had not yet been
received into evidence, punctuated by interjections from an unidentified, unsworn
Agency staff worker. (Tr. 41-53, 76-78.) Hospital counsel objected, suggesting that
Agency counsel at least be sworn as a witness, and demonstrating through "voir dire"
that Agency counsel did not know basic information about his own documents. Yet, the
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documents, with counsel's unsworn interpretation, were admitted, despite a continuing
objection that they lacked proper foundation. (Tr. 45, 53-56, 66.)
Moreover, the ALJ made no finding of fact in support of, or even referring to, a
supposed lack of diligence by the Hospital. The closest finding is No. 10, which
erroneously states that the DHCF sent a letter to the Daugaards confirming Sean's
eligibility on July P. The exhibit cited by the ALJ, Exhibit 10-4, states that the letter was
sent June 9 (Add. 24), and that date is confirmed in Exhibit 10-6 (Add. 27). The
Hospital does not dispute that the initial eligibility letter was sent June 9, but that letter
does not change the undisputed fact that Sean's eligibility was suspended thereafter,
from July 1 to July 9. (Tr. 20, 30-31, 58-59.) The Agency argues that the Hospital
should have discovered Sean's corrected status after July P, but there is no evidence to
support that argument. The evidence is undisputed that the Hospital had no access to the
internal computer updates by Debbie Lucero on July 9, and that the Hospital received no
notice of the new Medicaid card mailed out on July 10. (Tr. 34-35, 37, 48-50, 57-60.)
Accordingly, in the absence of any finding or evidence to support the Agency's
conclusion of lack of diligence by the Hospital, that conclusion is arbitrary and must be
set aside. See, e.g., Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Utah App. 1991)
(absence of adequate findings based on supporting evidence renders agency decision
arbitrary and capricious). In any event, provider neglect does not preclude recovery for
admittedly appropriate services to an eligible recipient. See In re Nemis, supra, 351 A.2d
at 366.
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In summary, the Agency may not withhold payment for lack of prior
authorization. Alternatively, any such requirement should be deemed waived, or
satisfied, because of the Agency's own misinformation, which it had a duty to correct.
Moreover, the Hospital had no duty to suspect and discover the misrepresentation, and
the Agency's conclusion to the contrary lacks supporting evidence and findings.
POINT II:

AGENCY DENIAL OF RETROACTIVE AUTHORIZATION FOR
THE SERVICES IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND PRIOR
PRACTICE, IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND IS
OTHERWISE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

The Agency's own regulations allow for retroactive authorization of Medicaid
services. Rule R414-1-22 permits retroactive Medicaid coverage for services rendered
up to three months preceding the application date if the recipient was eligible at the time
of service. (Add. 50.) Rule R414-10A-4(5) specifically allows retroactive authorization
of transplantation services:
Post transplant authorization for transplantation services provided
under unusual, emergency circumstances may be given only when:
(a) all Utah Medicaid criteria . . . are met; and
(b) both the transplant center and the . . . specialist evaluation . . . are
submitted with the recommendation . . . . [Add. 53.]
Conditions (a) and (b) are not disputed. Consistent with these provisions for retroactive
authorization, provider claims for payment can be submitted up to twelve months after
the first date of service. Rule R414-24-1.
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The Hospital presented evidence through Bernadette McNally, its Bone Marrow
Transplant Program Manager, regarding the practice of obtaining retroactive
authorization for transplant services when Medicaid eligibility could not be established
prior to the service. Ms. McNally testified:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Have you, say, in the last year, had a situation where at the time of
admission a patient was ineligible for Medicaid but later was
determined to be eligible and then you submitted a request for
retroactive prior authorization? Have you had that situation?
Yes, I have.
And was that approved?
Yes, it was approved. [Tr. 70.]

The Agency presented no contrary evidence and no evidence to justify departure from its
practice in prior cases. In fact, Agency counsel conceded the practice of retroactive
authorization in his opening argument:
[I]n the past, the Division of Health Care Financing has on occasion,
when a provider was unaware that a patient was going to be a Medicaid
recipient, they have suspended the requirements for prior authorization.
And by doing so, they have pointed to our—the transplant rule R414-10A-4,
subparagraph 5, talking about post-transplant authorization under unusual
or emergency circumstances.
And basically that has boiled down to a situation where the
provider—there was no way possible they could have known that the patient
was Medicaid-eligible, after the fact they required authorization and it was
granted based upon the fact that Medicaid eligibility was not established.
And so we've -we've done that in the past. [Tr. 15-16, emp. added.]
Those very circumstances exist in this case. The Hospital was unaware of Sean's
eligibility because the Agency represented that he was not eligible.

23

Despite the undisputed evidence of prior practice, the Agency concluded that
retroactive authorization was not justified in this case for the sole reason that the facts do
"not rise to the level of unusual circumstances." (Rec. Concl. of Law No. 2, Add. 5.)
However, that conclusion is not based on any evidence or finding of fact. Rather, it is
based on the opinion of Agency counsel, presented in opening arguments, that this case is
not "unusual" because "Sean had a history of Medicaid eligibility" and "it was
unreasonable" for the Hospital not to know that he was eligible. (Rec. Dec. p. 4, Add.
6.) Because the Agency's conclusion is based entirely on the unsupported opinion of
Agency counsel, and is not supported by any finding of fact, it must be set aside. See
Green and Wilson, supra (arguments and opinions of lawyers do not constitute
admissible evidence); Adams v. Board of Review, supra, 821 P.2d at 4-6 (failure of
agency to make supporting findings of fact renders its conclusions arbitrary and
capricious). Moreover, the Agency's unjustified departure from prior practice requires
reversal as a matter of law. See Pickett v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, supra, 858 P.2d at
191.
The Hospital's course of action was not "unreasonable" under the "unusual
circumstances" of this case. Mr. Fairborn asked Ms. Lucero on July 9 if Sean was
Medicaid eligible; she responded that he was not, and that a new application was
required. In compliance with Agency direction, Mr. Fairborn submitted a new
application that same day. Mr. Fairborn had no reason to question or disbelieve Ms.
Lucero; the public has no duty to presume that government officers are untruthful.
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Moreover, as set forth above, the past course of dealing with Ms. Lucero justified Mr.
Fairborn in accepting her information as true and in waiting for her further response.
The Agency presented no evidence that misinformation by its officers is anything but
"unusual"; indeed, if misinformation were not unusual the Agency would be operating
contrary to law and its continued existence would be in jeopardy. As held on similar
facts in In re Nemis, supra, 351 A.2d at 366, misleading agency action, or inaction, that
creates confusion in the attempted compliance with complex agency regulations justifies
application of regulatory exceptions. The circumstances in this case are unusual in that
the Agency provided false information that Sean was not Medicaid eligible, required a
new application that was never processed, reinstated Sean's eligibility without notifying
the Hospital, and then denied retroactive authorization, contrary to prior practice, even
though the services were admittedly necessary and appropriate.
Accordingly, the exception for post transplant authorization in R414-10A-4(5)
plainly applies. The Agency's refusal to apply that exception is contrary to prior
practice, is without support in the findings and evidence, is an abuse of discretion, and is
otherwise arbitrary and capricious.
POINT III: THE AGENCY IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED TO DENY PAYMENT
FOR LACK OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION OF THE
TRANSPLANT SERVICES.
Equitable estoppel may be asserted against a state agency in "unusual
circumstances 'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require."' Eldredge v.
Utah State Retirement Bd9 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990). Application of
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equitable estoppel is appropriate in such cases when the facts are clear and "the injustice
to be suffered is of sufficient gravity." Id. The elements for equitable estoppel are (1) a
statement, act, or inaction by the agency inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (2)
reasonable action or inaction by the other party in reliance on the agency's initial
position; and (3) injury would result from allowing the agency to act contrary to its initial
position. Id. For example, in Eldredge, this Court held that the State Retirement Board
was equitably estopped to require a retiree to "purchase" a portion of his retirement
benefit when he had been informed prior to his retirement that no purchase was
necessary. Id. See also Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm yn, 864 P.2d 904, 909 (Utah App.
1993).
The elements of equitable estoppel are satisfied in this case. On July 9, the
Agency's Medicaid eligibility list showed Sean Daugaard as ineligible. On direct inquiry
that same day, the Agency told the Hospital that Sean was not Medicaid eligible and that
a new application would have to be processed. In reliance on those two sources of
Agency information, the Hospital withheld a prior authorization request form, and instead
submitted a Medicaid application form. As a further basis for estoppel, the Hospital
waited for a response from the Agency, in reliance on the Agency's prior practice of
providing immediate notice of eligibility determinations. As a result of its reliance on
Agency information and prior practice, the Hospital waited to submit an authorization
form until it learned that Sean was in fact Medicaid eligible. The Agency has now
changed its positions, asserting that Sean was eligible all along, and that the Hospital
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should have known or taken other steps to learn that the Agency's information was false.
If the Agency is thus permitted to change its positions, the Hospital will be financially
injured by the denial of reimbursement for admittedly reasonable and necessary medical
services. Applying this Court's reasoning in Eldredge, supra, a government body
charged with administering a program as important as Medicaid "bears a most stringent
duty to abstain from giving inaccurate or misleading advice." 795 P.2d at 676. To
permit the Agency "to disavow its representations would work a serious and manifest
injustice" on the Hospital. Id. By contrast, neither the Agency nor the public is "unduly
threatened or damaged by estoppel," id., because the Agency can still obtain statutory
reimbursement from the federal government.
Other similar cases support application of equitable estoppel in this case. In
Society of the New York Hospital v. Mogensen, supra, in which the hospital delayed a
request for payment because it was unaware of the recipient's Medicaid eligibility, the
court held that the agency was equitably estopped to deny payment:
The department's own actions in approving the recipient and his wife for
Medicaid estop it from asserting any defense or defenses which merely
seek to delay a final adjudication. [319 N.Y.S.2d at 262.]
Given the fair value of the services rendered, the court acknowledged the need to "slice
through the bureaucracy to insure that payment is made to the innocent vendor." Id.
Moreover, the state was not prejudiced by application of estoppel because there is no
limitations period on the state's right to federal reimbursement. Id. Likewise, in
Magnantv. Ambulatory Renal Services, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 1029 (Ind. App. 1991), the
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state Medicaid administrator withheld payments for dialysis transportation services
because of suspected fraudulent Medicaid claims. However, the court held that the
agency was equitably estopped to withhold payment because it had previously approved
the services. Id. at 1033-34.
In this case, the Agency concluded that equitable estoppel should not apply
because the Hospital's actions were not "entirely reasonable" and "the injustice to be
suffered is [not] of sufficient gravity." (Rec. Dec, p. 5, Add. 7; see Concl. of Law No.
2.) Specifically, the Agency concluded that because Sean had a history of Medicaid
eligibility, the Hospital should have known that his eligibility would be reinstated. (Id.)
However, again, the Agency's conclusion is wholly unsupported by the findings of fact
and the evidence.
No finding of fact suggests that the Hospital's knowledge of Sean's previous
eligibility should have led the Hospital to assume that the Agency's information was
false and that a request for prior authorization should be submitted anyway. Obviously,
past Medicaid eligibility does not ensure future eligibility, as financial and family
circumstances can change over time. According to the Agency, that is precisely why
Sean's record showed no eligibility on July 9; his status required review before it could
be reinstated. (Tr. 30-31.) Nor is there any finding or evidence to suggest that the
Agency would not act on the new application submitted July 9. As set forth in Point I,
above, the duty of action was on the Agency to correct its prior misinformation, not on
the Hospital to discover the falsity of the information. Any suggestion to the contrary
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comes only from arguments of Agency counsel, and is not based on any sworn testimony.
Accordingly, the Agency's conclusion must be set aside. See Adams v. Board of Review,
supra, 821 P.2d at 4-6 (absence of adequate findings renders conclusion arbitrary and
capricious); Wilson v. Williamsy supra, 933 P.2d at 761 (arguments of counsel are not
evidence).
Finally, the notion that the injustice and injury suffered here is not sufficiently
grave to invoke equitable estoppel is also arbitrary and without support. The $250,000
owed for the services rendered here is far more than the additional $25,000 that justified
application of estoppel in Eldredge. 795 P.2d at 674. Equally important, however, is the
message sent to medical providers who, if this decision is left uncorrected, will be less
willing to risk providing emergency services to patients in need, with the resulting loss to
society and impairment of the Medicaid program. See Greenstein v. Bane, supra, 833 F.
Supp. at 1060 (vendor payment principle eliminates disincentive to provide services
based on fear of nonpayment).
In summary, the unusual circumstances of this case justify application of equitable
estoppel to accomplish justice.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should vacate the Final Agency Order and
direct the DHCF to reimburse the Hospital for medical services rendered to Sean
Daugaard.
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PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL/
SEAN DAUGAARD
Petitioner
FINAL AGENCY ORDER
Case No. 98-033-47

vs.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING,
Respondent.

IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOULD
LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A PETITION IN THE UTAH
COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS
SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ASK FOR A
RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO IF YOU WISH. IF YOU HAVE
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6576.
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section 63-46b-12
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review - Procedure," and Department of
Health Administrative Rule R410-14, entitled "Division of Health Care Financing
Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and
Providers."
I hereby adopt Recommended Decision No, 98-033-47 in its entirety.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Order is issued, you may file a
written request for reconsideration with the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing.
Any request for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is requested.
The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review.

0000002

Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty
(30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action or, if a request for reconsideration is
filed and denied, within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration. The petition shall
be served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the specific grounds upon
which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit may
constitute a waiver of any right to appeal the Final Agency Order.
A copy of this Final Agency Order shall be sent to Petitioner or representative at the last
known address by certified mail, return receipt requested.

DATED this

/^

day of October 1998

BY.
, .
Midnael Deily, Director
Division of Health Care Fina;
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
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BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING
STATE OF UTAH
00O00—

PRIMARY CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL/
SEAN DAUGAARD
Petitioner,

:

vs.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,
Respondent.

RECOMMENDED DECISION

:
:

Case No. 98-033-47
Margaret J. Clark
Administrative Law Judge

:

Pursuant to Rule R410-14 of the Utah Department of Health and the Utah Administrative
Hearing Procedures Act, Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a
formal administrative hearing for the above captioned case was held on August 12, 1998, at
9:30 a.m., in Room 344, Cannon Health Building. 288 North 1460 West, Salt Lake-City,
Utah 84116, Margaret J. Clark, Administrative Law Judge, presiding. The petitioner was
represented by David Erickson, Attorney at Law. The respondent was represented by Robert
Stewart, Staff Attorney for the Division of Health Care Financing (DHCF), Utah Department
of Health. Bernadette McNally and Richard Fairbourn testified on behalf of Primary
Children's Hospital ("PCMC").
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ISSUE
WAS DHCF CORRECT IN DENYING REIMBURSEMENT TO PCMC FOR A BONE
MARROW TRANSPLANT FOR LACK OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION?

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Sean was admitted to PCMC for preparation for a bone marrow transplant on July 8, 1997,
and for the transplant itself on July 17, 1997. Sean was discharged from PCMC on September
19, 1997.
2. On or about September 19, 1997, Dr. Ted Keyes, a treating physician of Sean's,
submitted a prior authorization request form on his behalf.
3. Richard Fairbourn, who worked as a resource counselor for PCMC in July 1997, had
worked with Sean's family in March 1997 to establish financial eligibility for Medicaid.
4. On July 9, 1997, the day after Sean was admitted to PCMC, his family had not received a
medical card for the month of July and one had not yet been issued.
5. When Mr. Fairbourn routinely checked the State's computer on July 9, 1997, he was
concerned when it appeared to him that Sean did not have Medicaid eligibility. At that time he
went to Debbie Lucero, a state eligibility worker at PCMC and asked her why Sean did not
have Medicaid eligibility.
6. Mr. Fairbourn asked Debbie Lucero how Sean could have a history of Medicaid eligibility
and then not show it on the States's eligibility computer on July 9, 1997.
7. In light of to Ms. Lucero's response that the case was in review status and needed a new
eligibility application, Mr. Fairbourn asked Sean's mother to complete a new eligibility
application. When it was completed, Mr. Fairbourn personally took it to Debbie Lucero and
handed it to her on July 9, 1997.
9. On July 9, 1997, Mr. Fairbourn. typed the following note into the hospital computer:
'TEND: NDCD APP with DEB [see Petitioner's Exhibit 3].
10. Mr. Fairbourn was not aware that Sean's eligibility status was confirmed later on July 9
and a letter so stating went out to the client on that date [see Respondent's Exhibit 10-4 ].
11. On August 1, 1997, when Mr. Fairbourn was routinely reviewing his accounts, he learned
for the first time that the State computer showed Medicaid eligibility for Sean for July and
August.
2
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12. On August 1, 1997, Mr. Fairbourn typed the note into the hospital computer: UCAID
ELIG FOR D.O.S." so employees at PCMC could have access to that knowledge.
13. Debbie Lucero normally informed Mr. Fairbourn when cases become eligible. Although
Ms. Lucero knew this case involved a large amount of money, she failed to inform Mr.
Fairbourn of Sean's eligibility.
14. The prior authorization request form was signed on September 19, 1997, and received by
DHCF on 10-29-97 [see Respondent's Exhibit 11].

RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. I recommend that denial of reimbursement for Sean Daugaard's bone marrow transplant be
AFFIRMED because there is nothing in the record to indicate Ms. Lucero had an affirmative
duty to keep PCMC apprised of new eligibility approvals, although that had been her custom.
Having known the financial impact of this case, PCMC was not diligent in following through
with tracking eligibility status.
2. Based upon the hearing record as a whole, including PCMC's lack of diligence in tracking
the eligibility and filing the prior authorization request, does not rise to the level of unusual
circumstances or equitable estoppel.

REASONS FOR PRESIDING OFFICER'S DECISION
Petitioner contended that on July 9, 1997, Medicaid eligibility for July had not been
authorized.
Petitioner also contended that the pertinent part of the transplant rule R410-10A-4(5), which
pertains to prior authorization is ambiguous. That section states:
Post transplant authorization for transplantation services provided under
unusual, emergency circumstances may be given [when all other criteria are
met]; emphasis added.
Petitioner contended that with the comma between unusual and emergency circumstances, a
reasonable reading would be to consider the meaning to be "unusual OR emergency.
3
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circumstances."
Finally the petitioner argued that the state should be estopped from now saying that PCMC
should have sent in a prior authorization request form.
Respondent contended that there was never a break in Sean's medical eligibility and that this
should have been obvious to PCMC.
Mr. Stewart stated in his opening argument that the State had previously suspended prior
authorization requirements "when a provider was unaware that a patient was going to be a
Medicaid recipient, and in doing so DHCF had followed R410-10A-4(5) which allows post
transplant authorization "under unusual, emergency circumstances" circumstances [Tr. at 15].
Mr. Stewart distinguished that situation from the current case because Sean had a history of
Medicaid eligibility and contended, therefore, that it was unreasonable for PCMC not to make
more affirmative efforts to learn of Sean's financial eligibility.
Petitioner contended that the elements of estoppel set forth in Eldredge v. Utah State
Retirement Bd.. 795 P2d 671 (Ct. App. 1990) were met and PCMC's actions were reasonably
prudent and diligent in processing the prior authorization request.
In the Eldredge case, Mr. Eldredge, a county employee, received conflicting information on
whether he could retire after a certain number of years without having to purchase previous
years from when he had worked for the county at an earlier time. The Utah Court of appeals
sets forth the elements of the doctrine of estoppel as follows:
As a general rule under case law, the doctrine of estoppel is not assertable against the
state and its agencies [citations omitted]. Utah courts have, however, carved out an
exception to this general common law rule in unusual circumstances "where it is plain
that the interests of justice so require [citations omitted]. In cases where such an issue
arises, the critical inquire is whether it appears that the facts may be found with such
certainty, and the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the
exception [citations omitted].
The Court of Appeals then set forth in Eldredge the elements:
The elements essential to invoke inequitable estoppel are: (1) a statement,
admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later
asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other party taken on the basis
of the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to
the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or
repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act [citations omitted].

4
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Based upon the evidence in the hearing record as a whole, the facts of this case do not meet all
of the elements of government estoppel or the "unusual circumstances" referred to in Utah
Administrative Rule R410-10A-4(5). Based upon the fact that PCMC had prior knowledge of
the patient's Medicaid and did not'follow up on the status of a case with this much of a
financial impact, it is difficult to determine that PCMC's actions were entirely reasonable or
that the injustice to be suffered is of sufficient gravity to invoke the exception.
RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION
Wherefore, based upon the evidence in the formal hearing record as a whole, the presiding
officer concludes that DHCF's decision to deny authorization for lack of prior authorization
for Sean's bone marrow transplant be AFFIRMED.

DATED this
lis *<*_ day of September 1998

Administrative Law Judge

5
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David B. Erickson #3788
Attorney for Petitioner
36 South State Street, 22nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 442-3810

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Division of Health Care Financing
PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL
CENTER/ SEAN DAUGAARD,

:
:
:

Petitioner,
vs.
Utah Department of Health Division of
Health Care Financing,
Respondent.

:
:
:
:

EXHIBIT ONE
Case No. 98-033-47
Honorable Margaret J. Clark
Administrative Law Judge

:
SELECTED MEDICAL RECORDS OF
SEAN DAUGAARD
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Name: DAUGAARD, S e a n
DEPARTMENT OF PATHOLOGY

MR Ho: 3 2 - 0 9 - 8 7

PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER
100 NORTH MEDICAL DRIVE
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH B4113
TELEPHONE (801) 688-3167

PS 0 7 2 3 - 9 7

DOB: 0 5 / 2 6 / 9 2

Room No:.

Sex: M

Physician:

P a t r i c k B e a t t y , M.D.

Date of Surg: 03/31749

Date Rec'd: 03/31/97

Time Rec'd:
PATHOLOGISTS
CHERYL M , COFFIN, M 4 \
A M Y LOWICHIK, */LD>
THEODORE J . PYSHER. M.D.

Account i:

46792958

clinical Hx: The p a t i e n t i s a 4 - y e a r - o l d boy who
p r e s e n t s with acute leukemia.
Operative

Findings/Dx:

CODE: T1
DIAGNOSIS:
PERIPHERAL BLOOD AND ILIAC CREST BONE MARROW ASPIRATE: ACUTE
LYMPHOBLASTIC LEUKEMIA (T-CELL PHENOTYPE). SEE UUHSC COMMENT.
GROSS DESCRIPTION:
A bone marrow aspirate from the left iliac crest is received from
Patrick BeattYt M.D. Aspirate smears are prepared and the remainder of the specimen is fixed
in B5 solution, filtered and submitted for histologic study. Portions of the specimen are sent
to LDS Row Cytometry Laboratory and University of Utah Cytogenetics Laboratory for workup
and the reports from those services are attached. Representative peripheral blood smears and
bone marrow aspirate smears and clot sections have been referred to the Hematopathology
Service at the University of Utah Health Sciences Center for evaluation. JN/tac 071797
COMMENT:
Attached is the report from Carl R. Kjeldsberg, M.D. of the Hematopathology
Service, University of Utah Health Sciences Center. CMC/sm 072197
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Sherrie L. Perkins, M.D., Ph.D., Laboratory Director
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MICROSCOPIC
Flow cytoeetric analysis was perforrcd on the bone sarrow aspirate at LDS
Hospital ( F L 4 J 4 - 9 7 ) . An abnonal, inature T-cell population representing
between 18 to & X of cells in the speciien was identified in the "lyiphoid
gate-. These cells have the following inunophenotypc: CD34+f CD2+, CD3*
!dit), CD5+ (diz). CD7 X , ard TdT+ (die subpopulation). This cell populati:n
cay express yery dii CD33 and possibly CD10. B-csil antigens or other lyeloid
antigens are not identified on this blast population. The retaining cells
show saturing lonocytic and syebid patterns.

I
I

Cytccheiica! studies were also perfoned on a peripheral blood saiple obtained
April 1, 1997. Morphologically, a definitive blast population is lore easily
identified. These cells show no reactivity with Ryeloperoxidase or
nonspecific esterase. Flow cytoietric analysis was also perfoned on the
peripheral blood (FLA77-97). An inature T-cell population with an
iiiunophenotype siiilar to that identified in the bone tarrow aspirate
(R.454-97) was identified. By flow, this population represents 13* of cell:
in the peripheral blood. A lanual differential count perfoned or. the
peripheral blood the sare day showed 16* blasts. JN/ali

I
I
I
I
I

I

DIAGNOSIS
PERIPHERAL BLOOD AND BONE HARROW - ACUTE LYMPHOBLASTIC LEiMEMIR (T-CELL
PHENOTYPE). SEE COMt€NT. '
04/03/97
CCRK/ali) Diagnosis by: Carl R. Kjeldsberg, M.D.
Verified by:

j

Carl R. Kjeldsberg, M.D.
electrcnir signature

CQKSJTS

I
1

This is an extreiely difficult case. Morphologically, there is a definitive
PLL blast population in the aspirate which corresponds to the CD34*, imt'ire
T-cell pcpulaticn identified by flow and by TdT positivity on
iiiur.Dfluoresrer.ce. Additionally, all of the blasts present in the periphe*-?!
blood are of T-cell phenotype by flow. The bone narrow also contains a large
r.uxbe- :f relatively iaiature r/eloid cells. In well stained, uncrewded crD3'.
of t*:c scear lest these cells have features of abnerra! proiyelocytes (nuclear
heff, azurophilic granules), tyelocytes and proionocytes. This correlates
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Sherrie L. Perkins, N.D., Ph.D., Laboratory Director
HEMATDPATH0L0GY REPORT

OWENTS
with the lack of a significant CD34* tyeloid blast population by flow. Because
of the larkedly abnorial tyeloid xaturation and proiinent bone tarrow and
peripheral blood conocytosis with dysplasia, NSE negative lonocytes, we feel
the best interpretation of this speciien is acute lysphoblastic leukeoia
(T-cell phenotype) arising froc a r/elodysplastic/eyeloproHfe^ctive disorder
such as O W L or juvsr.ile OIL. Correlation with cytcQenctics lay be useful.
The results of this exaiination were discussed with Dr. Bruggers on 4/1/97.
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MICROSCOPIC
(FL454-97) was identified. Bv flow, this oooulation reoresents 13* of cells
in the oerioheral blood. A lanual differential count oerfoned on the
oerioheral blood the saie dav showed Ik* blasts. JN/ali
DIAGNOSIS
PERIPHERAL BLOOD AND BONE HARROW - ACUTE LYMPHOBLASTIC LEUKEMIA (T-CELL
PHENOTYPE). SEE COMMENT.
T0X000. T06000. DC0107. MCOO&fc
04/03/97
(CRK/alr) Diaonosis bv: Carl R. Kieldsbe^o. M.D.
Verified bv:

Carl R. Kieldsbero. M.D.
electronic sionature

colors
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This is an extreielv difficult case. Moroholoaicallv. there is a definitive
ALL blast oooulation in the asoirate which corresoonds to the CD34+. inature
T-cell oooulation identified bv flow and bv TdT oositivitv on
immunofluorescence. Additionallv. all of the blasts oresent in the oerioheral
blood are of T-cell ohenotvoe bv flow. The bone farrow also contains a laroe
nutber of relatively inature iveloid cells. In well stained, uncrowded areas
of the siear lost these cells have features of abnorial oroivelocvtes (nuclear
hoff. azurophilic aranules). ivelocvtes and oroeonoevtes. This correlates
with the lack of a sionificant CD34* iveloid blast oooulation bv flow. Because
of the tarkedlv abnorial tveloid laturation and oroiinent bone larrow and
oerioheral blood tonoevtosis with dvsolasia. NSE neoative lonocvtes. we feel
the best interoretation of this soeciien is acute lviohoblastic leukeiia
(T-cell Dhenotvoe) arisino froi a •velodvsolastic/ivelooroliferative disorder
such as CMML or iuvenile CML. Correlation with cvtoaenetics iav be useful.
The results of this examination were discussed with Dr. Bruooers on 4/1/S7.
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April 24, 1997
Dick Lemons, MD
PCMC Hem/One
Re: Sean Daaguard
Dear Dick,
I met with the mother of Sean Daaguard to review the role of bone
marrow transplant in the treatment of Sean's leukemia. As you know,
he is now an almost five year old male who initially presented with
large cervical nodes and high spiking fevers in November 1996. He
was felt at that time to have an EBV infection and was treated with
steroids with good response of both his fever and size of his lymph
nodes. However, once the steroids were stopped he again had an
increase in his lymph nodes size and began running low grade
fevers. Because of these recurrent symptoms he was seen by his
doctor who noted a white count of >60,000, and platelets 53,000. He
was referred to Hem/One where a bone marrow showed the presence of
blasts. Flow cytometry showed between 18-26% lymphoblasts. The
histologic appearance of the bone marrow showed presence of both
small lymphoblasts and abnormal myeloid cells that appeared to have
abnormal development/arrest. His cytogenetics were completely
normal as was his CSF. The diagnosis of Acute Lymphoblastic
Leukemia with an underlying myelodysplastic picture was made. He
was started on IDA DCTER on 3/30/97 and received his second dose of
chemotherapy on 4/8/97. His bone marrow on day 10 has shown
evidence of good response with only 10% cellularity but 19%
persistent blasts. His clinical course to date has been complicated
by infectious disease issues. He has had a positive blood culture
for strep and in addition his skin lesion was biopsied positive for
aspergillus. His head, chest, sinus, and abdominal CT show no
evidence of invasive fungal disease although abdominal CT shows
evidence of typhlitis, HLA typing of his one full sibling and
parents show no evidence of a match. We will continue to type his
half sibling and then evaluate other potential family members for
typing.
I discussed in general the issue of proceeding on to transplant.

0000015

Bone marrow transplant offers a greater chance of cure than nonmyeloablative chemotherapy. I reviewed briefly the scenario of
eight weeks of inpatient hospitalization followed by many weeks to
months of outpatient therapy. We also reviewed briefly the risks of
the radiation and chemotherapy, those being marrow ablation and
therefore the risk of life threatening infection, mucositis,
diarrhea, liver and kidney toxicity, and long term effects with
radiation of cataracts, thyroid failure and sterility. Sean's
mother, was fairly overwhelmed by the enormity of Sean's needs at
this point. We therefore did not go into further detail about the
mechanics of transplant. She appears to understand the need for
transplant but is very worried about how to take care of Sean and
maintain care for herself and the rest of her family.
My recommendation is that Sean proceed with his non-myeloablative
chemotherapy. Once his infectious disease issues have been resolved
and we have seen how his marrow responds to chemotherapy, I would
recommend that we proceed with a bone marrow transplant. If we can
identify a family member that is a reasonable match they would
obviously be the best choice. However, if we cannot identify a
family member, I would recommend we proceed to an unrelated
transplant. I will need to speak again with Sean's parents and
other family members about the details of transplant within the
next couple of weeks. If you have any questions please don't
hesitate to call.
Sincerely,

Roberta H. Adams, MD
Director, Pediatric Blood and Marrow Transplant
cc:

Parents
Marcella Gaughan
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Dr. Wain Allen
82 North 50 East
P.O. Box 730
Coalville, Utah 84017
Re: Sean Daugaard
PCMC# 32-09-87
Dear Dr. Allen:
I am writing to update you regarding Sean Daugaard, the youngster who
presented with lymphadenopathy and cytopenias in March of 1997. 1 believe Dr.
Carroll who was the attending, was in communication with you at that time but I will
summarize his hospital course now. Briefly, he was admitted to the PICU because of
concern regarding airway compromise due to his significant adenopathy. Bone marrow
aspiration was done which was originally felt to be ANLL and he was started on
chemotherapy consisting of Idarubicin, Ara-C, etoposide, 6-TG and decadron. His CSF
was negative for evidence of disease. Further evaluation of his marrow revealed that
the predominant blasts present were actually T-cell lymphoblasts which was felt to
arise in the pre-existing myelodysplasia. He responded well to this initial
chemotherapy and vincristine was also added. He began his second cycle of
chemotherapy on April 8. However, this was discontinued after 2 days because of new
onset of worrisome skin rash at his wrist. Biopsy of that revealed aspergillus. He was
started on liposomal amphotericin which he has been on since mid-April. His counts
recovered, his bone marrow done on 5-1-97 revealed remission and in general he is
doing well.
Nutrition issues remain significant and he has recently been weaned off TPN
and onto NJ feeds. He was treated with chemotherapy consisting of high dose Ara-C
followed by L-asparaginase this past weekend and tolerated it well. He was discharged
home on 5-12-97 on NJ feeds as well as daily amphotericin. The amphotericin will be
administered with a nurse in the house for approximately 6 hours daily. It will be
continued through the nadir and count recovery following his most recent
chemotherapy.
Given the pre-existing myelodysplastic changes in Sean's marrow, we have
decided to pursue bone marrow transplantation as definitive therapy. Bone marrow
transplant team has been involved and is currently in the process of typing multiple
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family members. He does not have a sibling who directly matches but the hope is that
one of his more distant relatives may. However, I understand that an unrelated bone
marrow transplant search is ongoing at this time as well. It is our hope that by the time
his counts recover within 3 weeks he will be able to be admitted to the bone marrow
transplant unit and being his conditioning therapy. Decisions regarding amphotericin
therapy at that time will be made when he enters the unit upon ID recommendations.
There are significant psychosocial concerns with this family. However, we feel
that with the step-father at home during the night and registered nurse there for the
majority of the day, Sean should do well for the next few weeks. I understand that his
grandparents will be involved with transplant and post transplant care.
I hope this update is regarding Sean is adequate. As I look through his chart, I
am uncertain whether a letter was dictated prior to this time and I apologize if it was
not. We will be in close contact with Sean and his mother in the next few months.
However, if any new problems arise from your standpoint, please do not hesitate to
contact us.

Sincerely,
CO^^/V^Y^
Carol Bruggers, M.D.
Assistant Professor of Pediatrics
CB:ss
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ORIGINAL CLAIM
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HISTORY INQUIRY - INPATIENT UB-82 1/2

6

TCN: 97275211000021300 CAT-SVC: 01 ,CYCLE:
CLERK: 000 LOC:
CCP
AID TYPE: A5
FUND: A
CLM-STAT: N DENIED
MED-REC-NUM: 384679295
RECIPIENT-ID': 0302605602 D/E-NAME: DAUGA SEAN NAME: MCCAULEY
SEAN
NB:
BTH-DT: 05/26/92 SEX: M AGE: 005 PROV-TYP: .01 PROV-NUM: 942854058
OTHER-INS: N ESPDT:
FAMILY-PLAN:
AUTO-ACCID: N OTHER-ACCID: N EMPLOYMENT
PRIOR-AUTH:
P/A IND:
REF-LIC#:
ATT-PHYS: 87176
ADMIT-LIC#:
ADMIT-DATE: 07/08/97
ADMIT-HOUR: 08
ADMIT-TYPE: 1
BEGINNING-DATE-OF-SERVICE: 07/08/97
ENDING-DATE-OF-SERVICE: 09/19/97
ICD-9-CM 1: 20500 2: 99685 3: 00845 4: 2761 5: 2848
ACCIDENT-DATE:
SURG-LIC-NUM: 10797 SURG^PRQCzl-: 4103
SURG-PROC-2: 0331
SURG-PROC-3: 413
SURG-DAfSP:TT-07/l7/97 SURG-DATE-2: 07/08/97 SURG-DATE-3: 07/08
INELIG-DAYS: 000
OUTLIER-DAYS-APPROVED: 000
NON-COV-DAYS: 000
COV-DAYS: 073
DATE-DISC: 09/19/97
DATE-DEATH:
STILL-A-PATIENT:
DISCHARGE-STATUS : C
CHILD-ABUSE:
SIGNATURE-IND: Y
BILLING-DATE: 10/02/97
BILLING-TYPE: 111 ATTACH-IND: N
INS-CO:
ADJ-RSN:
TCN-TO-CREDIT: 00000-000-0000000
DATE-PAID: 10/03/97
WARRANT-NUM: 00000669344
REIMB-AMT:
.00
STRL-CONSENT-DATE:
INTERPRET-DATE:
CIRC-IND:
PAY-TO-PROV: 942854058211
CCF-SENT-DATE:
CO-PAYMENT-AMT:
DRG-CODE: 481
00 345 5 000
00 342 4 000
00 704 5 000
00 495 3 000
00 596 2 000

M\D'6 ~- IlXn<?_ i H ' V r r o u J V T P

Date: 3/30/98 Time: 02:51:33 PM

8wW
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Form Number
24 04 37

ATTACHMENT INDICATOR

REQUEST FOR PRIOR AUTHORIZATION
Prior Authorization
Document Number

1. Patient Name. Last. First. M I.

P581120

STATE USE ONLY
«. Effective Date

2 Age 3. Sex 4. Client I 0. Number

dAjA-bM)

rf&flN

_5L H

5. Patient Street Address. City, State, Zip Code

Mar

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
MEDICAL SERVICES FORM

A) uxcoBJZtoe

*n

17. Termination Date

. urr
8<&/j
a. PROCEDURES DC

£AHX>

8. Proposed Medical Supplies, Drug, Therapy, or Surgical Procedures
(Identify Primary Procedure First)

|

OR SURGICAL CODE

10. Units

12. STATE USE ONLY '
Approved
Yea/
Units
Amot{rtt

11. Estimated
Cost

Jfe_

1 l^^Qt^LfcTT^n

ftPHUe=

JrWA^gQfli

niRAO^PUrU
3 ^\)D

A^s^^rifVTFnn

13. Will the services of an.

A. Anesthesiologist be used? O Yes
B Assistant at Surgery be used** D Yes

14 Can this procedure be done in your office
• yes
15. Hospital or Surgical Center Name and Address

P&IHAO
/CO

CMU>£.&3?>

AJ0£7»-

5L(L

HET>.

HELICAL

UTftH.

K)fttX

pT.No

CtrtfEj^

(** no» CQ"»P*ate items IS through 18 below.)
17. Estimated
16". STATE USE ONLY
hospital days
of stay
Facility ProvKWf Number

OK^

18. ICD-9-CM CODE

19. STATE USE ONLY
L«£Sr5sa4 Approved

no

SHH3

20. SUMMARY OF HISTORY: (Physical Examination, Laboratory, X-ray studies, prescriptions, and other applicable documentation must be supplied in sufficient
detail to Justify the necessity for the procedure. If the patient is mentally retarded or under psychtatnc treatment, please so indicate and attach additional documentation as appropnate.)

5BEr

ATTACH

21. Non-Therapeutic Stenlfcation Request, complete "A" through " C " below. Also attach the completed copy No. 1 of Form 499-A (Part II), before mailing to this office.

* A. Is the above patient in an Institution orVcorrectional facility?-

•

* 8 . Is the above patient mentally lit?, j £ - V * V z"

DY«DNO

* C. Is the above patient merrtailv retarded? * -

' V * ...- - ' :

Yes • No
Patfent'a Date
of Birth: <'C**

" v / ' O Yea D Mo

MM
22. Name and Address of Requesting or Supplying Provider

'

^

- ~ v >„ A

Z>L<L UT
] 23. Signature

SY//3

——>

RAJ 6 0

F

REQUEST:

DO

YY

25. Name and Address of Referring or Prescribing Provider

4

/_? <*'7
26. Refemng or Prescribing
Provider License Number

24. Requesting
Provider Number (12 0IG1TS)

g4-l73J/Sg-l2Q5"

NOTE: This is NOT a certificate of eligibility nor a guarantee of payment amount
requested. Eligibility must be confirmed by reviewing an eligibility card current for
the month services are to be performed.

-<^>

/ r

: ; Y/+J&;

A- zi-:S\?Gi^ih*vn S T A T E U S E O N L T - * * *"%&

...

AT*??-,

I

z^M*£
SOH OHCF PA-3 (9-M)

"!•*.
^^*

^,tr*
T*^?^SIoju^g^tRey<ewtofl A u j h o d t y ^ ^ A P S E ^
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ACTION HISTORY

ACHI

12AUG98 10:09
ANA G
CASE NUMBER: 00280190

CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D
ACTION
DATE

ACTION
TIME

23JUL97
09JUL97
09JUL97
09JUL97
09JUL97
09JUL97
09JUN97
09JUN97
09JUN97
09JUN97
09JUN97
09JUN97
09JUN97
09JUN97

09:55:25
12:41:17
1*2:41:11
12:37:38
12:36:29
12:36:11
16:03:07
16:02:51
13:47:17
13:46:40
13:46:20
13:45:54
13:45:34
13:45:29

SECURITY
KEY USED

ACTION
TYPE

HLDELU>- C M °

ADD
CHANGE
UNKNOWN
CHANGE
CHANGE
ADD
CHANGE
UNKNOWN
CHANGE
CHANGE
CHANGE
CHANGE
ADD
CHANGE

HLDEL
HLDEL
HLDEL
HLML2
HLML2
HLDEL
HLDEL
HLDEL
HLDEL
HLDEL
HLDEL
HLDEL
HLDEL

SCREEN
ID

BENEFIT
MONTH

CAMM
EWAL
NORS
DMM1
DMM1
CAMM
EWAL
NORS
DMEX
DMEX
EAIN
EAIN
CAMM
DMEX

AUG97

DATE-->

Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:12:47 AM

PROGRAM
TYPE

BUDGETING
METHOD

JUL97
JUL97
JUL97

DM
DM

P
P

JUN97
MAY97
MAY97
JUN97
JUN97
MAY97

DM
DM

P
P

DM

P
NEXT-->

0000024
trayc : x U U L U U I C U L i^ame : £> . *±** '

NOHI
NOTICE HISTORY
12AUG98 09:59
NOTICE NUMBER: MMAA
ANA G
CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D
CASE NUMBER: 00280190
PROGRAM: DM BENEFIT MONTH: MAR97 DATE PRINTED: 09JUN97
FROM: LUCERO, DEBBIE E

YOUR APPLICATION FOR MEDICAID ASSISTANCE, DATED APRIL
11, 1997,
WAS APPROVED ON 09 JUN 1996.
7
YOUR MEDICAL COVERAGE BEGAN ON MARCH
01, 1997. YOU WILL RECEIVE A
MEDICAL CARD IN THE MAIL. IT WILL LIST THE NAMES AND I.D. NUMBER OF
ALL HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS WHO RECEIVE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. YOU MUST SHOW
THIS CARD TO THE DOCTOR, PHARMACY, OR HOSPITAL TO GET MEDICAL
COVERAGE.
YOUNG CHILDREN AND PREGNANT WOMEN MAY BE ELIGIBLE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL
FOOD FROM THE WIC PROGRAM. FOR INFORMATION CALL 1-800-662-3638 OR
CONTACT YOUR LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENT.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS NOTICE, PLEASE CALL US AT
SCREEN

1

OF

2

Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:03:08 AM

r*^

0000025
SVSV« W4.ltIV>J. A V,

J.1GUUC

NOHI
NOTICE HISTORY
12AUG98 10:00
ANA G
NOTICE NUMBER: MMAA
CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D
CASE NUMBER: 00280190
PROGRAM: DM BENEFIT MONTH: MAR97 DATE PRINTED: 09JUN97
FROM: LUCERO, DEBBIE E
801 588 2651,

SCREEN

2

OF

2

m

Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:03:19 AM

^J^^SSp^^l

0000026
Page: l Document Name: S.ul47

NOTICE HISTORY SUMMARY

NOHS

CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D

BR DEL

NOTICE
NUM PGM
GIFF
XMRV
GERE
ALIR
GICT
MMAA
MCIV
SCIV
FCMA
MMPN
ALBC
GIFF
XCRV
ALIR
GERE

DM
DM
DM
PN
FS
AF
PN

FS

BENEFIT
MONTH

DATE
PRINTED

05AUG98
21APR98
30OCT97
140CT97
23JUL97
09JUN97
MAR97
29AUG94
OCT94
AUG94
06JUL94
AUG94
06JUL94
AUG94
06JUL94
22AUG94
23JUN94
MAY94
20MAY94
21MAY94
MAY94
07JUN94
BENEFIT MONTH:
APR98
NOV97
OCT97

Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:06:45 AM

12AUG98 10:01
ANA G

CASE NUMBER: 00280190

NOTICE TITLE
FREE FORMAT - GENERAL INFORMATION
CASE CLOSED-INCOMPLETE REVIEW-MEDICAL
REVIEW COMPLETED
INCOMPLETE REVIEW
CASE TRANSFER
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE APPROVED
CLOSURE - FAILED TO PROVIDE INFORMATION
CLOSURE - FAILED TO PROVIDE INFO. - S
CLOSURE - MARRIAGE - F/M
MEDICAL PRENATAL ASSISTANCE APPROVED
ALERT - BIRTH OF CHILD
CASE CLOSED - INCOMPLETE REVIEW
INCOMPLETE REVIEW
REVIEW COMPLETED
MORE NOTICES:
NEXT-->

0000027
rdye: J» uuuumenc wame: £>. u±*k I
* INFO *
CAAL

TO DISPLAY MORE RECORDS PRESS ENTER
CASE ACTION LOG

CASE NUMBER: 00280190
ACTION

DATE

12AUG98 10:06
WORKER: ANA G
CASE NAME: DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D

WORKER NAME

DEPT/REG/OFF

3 0OCT97
ANITA
L HALL
HCS
RECEIVED BANK VERIFICATION AND POSTED ASSET AND INCOME INFORMATION
FOR OCTOBER REVIEW. FOUND ELIGIBLE.
AUTH DM FOR NOV AND DEC.
140CT97
ANITA
L HALL
HCS
REVIEW RECEIVED FOR THE CLIENT. IT IS NOT SIGNED, NOR IS THERE VERIF.
OF ASSET VALUE FOR BANK ACCOUNT.
THIS DATE I SENT ALIR TO CLIENT
09JUL97
DEBBIE
E LUCERO
HOP
CLIENT CAME IN NO CARD FOR JULY 97. AUTH JULY 97 CARD CLIENT REPORTED
SPOUSE NOT WORKING DID NOT REMOVE INCOME DOES NOT EFFECTIVE ELIG.
09JUN97
DEBBIE
E LUCERO
HOP
I HAVE RECD ALL NEEDED TO DO THIS DM. I HAD A HARD TIME GETTING THE INCOM
FROM THE EMPLOYER HE IS A CONSTRUCTION WORKER AND DOES HIS OWN BOOKS.
11APR97
DEBBIE
E LUCERO
HOP
I HAVE RECD AP HERE AT PCMC GAVE 124

SEARCH DATE

Date: 8/12/98 Time: 10:10:21 AM

NEXT

000002S
Page: 1 Document Name: Sc.^147
* INFO *
MEBH
CASE NAME:
BEN
MTH
APR98
MAR98
FEB98
JAN98
DEC97
NOV97
OCT97
SEP97
AUG97
JUL97
JUN97
MAY97
APR97
MAR97

PGM
TYP
DM
DM
DM
DM
DM
DM
DM
DM
DM
DM
DM
DM
DM
DM

MORE: PAGES EXIST
MEDICAL BENEFIT HISTORY SCREEN

12AUG98 10:05
ANA. G
CASE NUMBER: 00280190

DAUGAARD, JENNIFER D

CAT
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

CVG
GRP

NAME
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN
SEAN

PROGRAM TYPE:

Date: 8/12/98 Time*: 10:09:20 AM

M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M

MAIL
DATE
31MAR98
27FEB98
3 0JAN98
31DEC97
28NOV97
310CT97
30SEP97
29AUG97
31JUL97
10JUL97
10JUN97
10JUN97
10JUN97
10JUN97

EXCESS
AMOUNT
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

BENEFIT MONTHj

DOC ISS
STAT RSN
PE
RE
RE
PE
PE
RE
PE
RE
PE
RE
PE
RE
RE
PE
PE
RE
RE
PE
PE
RE
PE
RE
PE
RE
PE
RE
PE
IN

ISS
IND
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI
PI

NEXT-

SPI

63-46b-16

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

procity, where there had been no proceeding on
his application that was sufficiently judicial in
nature, and he had not yet had the licensing
agency's action reviewed in a "trial-type hearing.w Kirk v. Division of Occupational &Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
This section requires that the district court's
review of informal adjudicative proceedings be
accomplished by holding a new trial, not just by
reviewing an informal record; thus, the district
court erred in failing to conduct a trial de novo
of proceedings of the Department of Public
Safety relating to suspension of driving privileges. Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
District court does not have discretion to
review an informal adjudicative proceeding by
any method other than a trial de novo; this rule
guarantees the district court the opportunity to
correct any deficiencies that may arise because
of the informal nature of administrative proceedings and provides an adequate record for

future review. Archer v. Board of State Lands &
Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995).
Standard of review.
The reviewing court applies differing standards of review to an agency's legal interpretations: first, where the Legislature has explicitly
or implicitly delegated discretion to the agency
to interpret or apply that law, an intermediate
deference standard of review is applied; second,
where there is no explicit delegation of discretion and the issues are questions of constitutional law and statutory construction, the court
r e v iews the agency's decision for correctness,
Elks Lodges Nos. 719 & 2021 v. Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 R2d 1189
(Utah 1995).
Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d
233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by
the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten,
summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any
statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
346
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63-46b-16

(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decisionmaking process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-

ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction
and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of
deference an appellate court grants to an agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief
should not be granted when, although the
agency committed error, the error was harmless. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 814 R2d 581 (Utah 1991).
The ground for relief provided by Subsection
(4)(g) cannot be invoked to mount a facial
challenge to an interpretive guideline used by
an agency in its decision-making process.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 861 P.2d 414 (Utah 1993).

ANALYSIS

Agency action.
Applicability of section.
Arbitrary action.
Conflicting evidence.
Exhaustion of remedies.
Factual findings.
Final order.
Function of district court.
Jurisdictional hearing by board.
Prior practice.
Review.
Standard of review.
—Interpretation of statute.
—Questions of law.
Substantial evidence test.
Substantial prejudice.
Whole record test.
Cited.
Agency action.
Whether the industrial commission acted
contrary to its own rule was governed by Subsection (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App.
1993), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).
The tax commission's failure to detail how
federal restraints on the use of subsidized property should be assessed was not sufficient harm
to the property owners to justify relief, when
the only harm the owners alleged was that
counties performing future assessments on
subsidized housing would ignore the restraints.
Alta Pac. Assocs. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
931 P.2d 103 (Utah 1997).
Applicability of section.
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not

Arbitrary action.
Industrial commission's denial of occupational disease disability benefits based upon a
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of
causation failed to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and therefore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v.
Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
Conflicting evidence.
In undertaking a review, the appellate court
will not substitute its judgment as between two
reasonably conflicting views, even though the
court might have come to a different conclusion
had the case come before it for de novo review.
It is the province of the board, not appellate
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn
from the same evidence, it is for the board to
draw the inferences. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board
of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Appellate court refers to the assessment by

347
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26-18-1
Section
26-18-8.

26-18-9.

26-18-10.
26-18-11.

HEALTH CODE

Enforcement of public assistance statutes — Contract
with Office of Recovery Services.
Prohibited acts of state or local
employees of Medicaid program — "Violation a misdemeanor.
Utah Medical Assistance Program — Policies and standards.
Rural hospitals.

Drug Utilization Review Board

26-18-103.
26-18-104.
26-18-105.

26-18-108.
26-18-109.

Access to Health Care
26-18-301.
26-18-302.

26-18-305.

Definitions.
DUR Board — Creation and
membership — Expenses.
DUR Board — Responsibilities.
Confidentiality of records.
Drug prior approval program.

Advisory committees.
Retrospective and prospective
DUR.
Penalties.
Immunity.
Part 3

26-18-303.
26-18-304.

Part 2

26-18-101.
26-18-102.

Section
26-18-106.
26-18-107.

Definitions.
Department to award grants —
Applications.
Content of applications.
Process and criteria for awarding grants.
Report on implementation.
Part 4
Medicaid Waiver

26-18-401.
26-18-402.

Medicaid waiver.
Medicaid Restricted Account.

PARTI
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
26-18-1. Short title.
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Medical Assistance
Act."
History: C. 1953, 26-18-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1981, ch. 126, § 1 repealed former §§ 26-18-1
to 26-18-4 (L. 1963, ch. 38, §§ 1 to 4; 1969, ch.
197, §§ 64, 65; 1971, ch. 53, § 1), relating to

use of confidential information in research.
Present §§ 26-18-1 to 26-18-10 were enacted by
§ 17 of the act. For present provisions relating
to confidential information, see Chapter 25 of
this title.

26-18-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Applicant" means any person who requests assistance under the
medical programs of the state.
(2) "Division" means the Division of Health Care Financing within the
department, established under Section 26-18-2.1.
(3) "Client" means a person who the department has determined to be
eligible for assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical
Assistance Program established under Section 26-18-10.
(4) "Medicaid program" means the state program for medical assistance
for persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant to Title
X K of the federal Social Security Act.
(5) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services furnished or payments made to or on behalf of recipients of medical or hospital assistance
under state medical programs.
174
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(6) "Recipient" means a person who has received medical or hospital
assistance under the Medicaid program or the Utah Medical Assistance
Program established under Section 26-18-10.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 17; 1988, ch. 21, § 1.
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal

Social Security Act, cited in Subsection (4), is
compiled as 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.

26-18-2.1. Division — Creation.
There is created, within the department, the Division of Health Care
Financing which shall be responsible for implementing, organizing, and
maintaining the Medicaid program and the Utah Medical Assistance Program
established in Section 26-18-10, in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter and applicable federal law.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.1, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 2.

26-18-2.2. Director — Appointment — Responsibilities.
The director of the division shall be appointed by the executive director of the
department. The director of the division may employ other employees as
necessary to implement the provisions of this chapter, and shall:
(1) administer the responsibilities of the division as set forth in this
chapter;
(2) prepare and administer the division's budget; and
(3) establish and maintain a state plan for the Medicaid program in
compliance with federal law and regulations.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 3.

26-18-2.3. Division responsibilities — Emphasis — Periodic assessment.
(1) In accordance with the requirements of Title XIX of the Social Security
Act and applicable federal regulations, the division is responsible for the
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an efficient, economical manner. The division shall establish, on a statewide basis, a program to
safeguard against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services,
excessive payments, and unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or
lengths of stay. The division shall deny any provider claim for services that fail
to meet criteria established by the division concerning medical necessity or
appropriateness. The division shall place its emphasis on high quality care to
recipients in the most economical and cost-effective manner possible, with
regard to both publicly and privately provided services.
(2) The division shall implement and utilize cost-containment methods,
where possible, which may include, but are not limited to:
(a) prepayment and postpayment review systems to determine if utilization is reasonable and necessary;
(b) preadmission certification of nonemergency admissions;
175
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(c) mandatory outpatient, rather than inpatient, surgery in appropriate
cases;
(d) second surgical opinions;
(e) procedures for encouraging the use of outpatient services;
(f) coordination of benefits; and
(g) review and exclusion of providers who are not cost effective or who
have abused the Medicaid program, in accordance with the procedures and
provisions of federal law and regulation.
(3) The director of the division shall periodically assess the cost effectiveness and health implications of the existing Medicaid program, and consider
alternative approaches to the provision of covered health and medical services
through the Medicaid program, in order to reduce unnecessary or unreasonable utilization.
History: C. 1953, 26-18-2.3, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 21, § 4.
Federal Law. — Title XIX of the federal

Social Security Act, cited in Subsection (1), is
compiled as 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Discretion of division.
Resource preservation.
Discretion of division.
The legislature has, by virtue of Subsection
(1), explicitly granted the Division of Health
Care Financing (DHCF) discretion to establish
criteria concerning medical reimbursement.
When a hospital failed to submit a physician
certification before admission of a Medicaideligible patient and never obtained physician
recertification at any time during the patient's
three-month stay in acute care, the DHCF
reasonably denied reimbursement to the hospital. South Davis Community Hosp. v. Department of Health, 869 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).

Resource preservation.
Utah does not have a "resource spend down"
provision in its Medicaid plan, nor any statement of policy expressing a desire to preserve
the resources of potential beneficiaries. Utah's
statutes seem to evince a legislative concern for
economy and efficiency in the Medicaid program, not the preservation of applicants'assets.
Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health, 829 P.2d 122
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), afTd, 850 P.2d 1267 (Utah
1993).
It is not unreasonable for the division to
apply a fixed asset limit forbidding persons to
adjust their assets to become eligible for Medicaid benefits. Allen v. Utah Dep't of Health,
850 P.2d 1267 (Utah 1993).

26-18-3. Administration of Medicaid program by department — Disciplinary measures and sanctions —
Funds collected.
(1) The department shall be the single state agency responsible for the
administration of the Medicaid program in connection with the United States
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to Title XIX of the Social
Security Act.
(2) The department shall develop implementing policy in conformity with
this chapter, the requirements of Title XIX, and applicable federal regulations.
(3) The department may, in its discretion, contract with the Department of
Human Services or other qualified agencies for services in connection with the
administration of the Medicaid program, including but not limited to the
determination of the eligibility of individuals for the program, recovery of
overpayments, and enforcement of fraud and abuse laws to the extent
permitted by law and quality control services.
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Note 32
habilitation GrouD. Inc. v. Saboi, N.D.N.Y.1993,
841 F.Supp. 58.
Undocumented alien whose chronic alcoholism
had so compromised her liver and central nervous system before she appeared at hospital
that lack of immediate medical attention would
not have resulted in more serious jeopardy to
her health did not possess "emergency medical
condition," such that would be eligible for assistance under Medical Care and Assistance Program. Norwood Hosp. v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, Mass.1994, 627 N.E.2d 914, 417
Mass. 54.
Statute which states that Medicaid payment
shall be made for care and services'to alien
who is not lawfully admitted for permanent
residence, only if such care and services are
necessary for treatment of emergency medical
condition and alien otherwise meets eligibility
requirements for medical assistance of a State
plan, is exception to rule that prohibits Medicaid not only to nonresident aliens, but also to
resident aliens whose residency is unlawful; it
does not affect status of nonresident aliens.
Salem Hosp. v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, Mass.1991, 574 N.E.2d 385, 410 Mass.
625.
33. Relief from judgment or order •
State of New York was entitled to relief from
consent decree establishing Medicaid pharmacy
reimbursement methodology, where Secretary
of Health and Human Services had subsequently
established reimbursement cap on Medicaid reimbursements for certain defined medications,
creating risk that state would lose federal financial participation if it did not comply. Pharma§ 1396c.

ceutical Soc. of the State of New York, Inc. v.
Cuomo, S.D.N.Y.1991, 774 FJ3upp. 826, affirmed
in part, reversed in part 981 F2d 632.
34. Similarly situated individuals—Generally
Under federal Medicaid statute pursuant to
which federal payment for organ transplant will
not be made unless state plan provides for written standards and such standards provide that
similarly situated individuals are treated alike,
"similarly situated" means all patients who can
be treated effectively by same organ transplant
procedure. Salgado v. Kirschner, Ariz.1994,878
P.2d 659, 179 Ariz. 301, certiorari denied 115
S.Ct. 1102, 513 U.S. 1151, 130 L.Ed^d 1069.
35.
Other necessary services
Provision of state Medicaid plan that allowed
state to deny life-sustaining liver transplant coverage to otherwise eligible Medicaid recipient
solely because she was over 21 years of age
violated requirement of federal Medicaid statute
that state standards for organ transplants treat
similarly situated individuals alike; recipient
was within class of all patients who could be
treated effectively by liver transplant, and catchall provision of Medicaid statute dealing with
federal early and periodic health screening diagnostic and treatment services (EPSDT) did not,
as state apparently contended, define substantive scope of medically necessary procedures
and draw distinction for such procedures between children and adults. Salgado v. Kirschner, Ariz.1994, 878 P.2d 659, 179 Ariz. 301,
certiorari denied 115 S.Ct 1102, 513 U.S. 1151,
130 L.Ed.2d 1069.

Operation of State plans

NOTES OF DECISIONS
compliance with federal Medicaid requirements
is discretionary. Phoenix Baptist Hosp. and
Decision of Secretary of Health and Human
Medical Center, Inc. v. U.S., C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1991,
Services (HHS) as to whether to hold hearing on 937 F.2d 452.
9. Hearing

§ 1396& Definitions
For purposes of this subchapter—
(a) Medical assistance
The term "medical assistance" means payment of part or all of the cost of the
following care and services (if provided in or after the third month before the month in
which the recipient makes application for assistance or, in the case of medicare costsharing with respect to a qualified medicare beneficiary described in subsection (p)(l) of
this section, if provided after the month in which the individual becomes such a
beneficiary) for individuals, and, with respect to physicians' or dentists' services, at the
option of the State, to individuals (other than individuals with respect to whom there is
being paid, or who are eligible, or would be eligible if they were not in a medical
institution, to have paid with respect to them a State supplementary payment and are
eligible for medical assistance equal in amount, duration, and scope to the medical
assistance made available to individuals described in section 1396a(a)(10)(A) of this title)
not receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under subchapter I,
X, XIV, or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV, and with respect to whom supplemental
security income benefits are not being paid under subchapter XVI of this chapter, who
are—
(i) under the age of 21, or, at the option of the State, under the age of 20,19, or
18 as the State may choose,
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(ii) relatives specified in section 606(b)(1) of this title with whom a child is living
if such child is (or would, if needy, be) a dependent child under part A of subchapter
IV of this chapter,
(iii) 65 years of age or older,
(iv) blind, with respect to States eligible to participate in the State plan program
established under subchapter XVI of this chapter,
(v) 18 years of age or older and permanently and totally disabled, with respect to
States eligible to participate in the State plan program established under subchapter XVI of this chapter,
(vi) persons essential (as described in the second sentence of this subsection) to
individuals receiving aid or assistance under State plans approved under subchapter
I„X, XIV, or XVI of this chapter,
(vii) blind or disabled as defined in section 1382c of this title, with respect to
States not eligible to participate in the State plan program established under
subchapter XVI of this chapter,
(viii) pregnant women,
(ix) individuals provided extended benefits under section 1396r-6 of this title,
(x) individuals described m section 1396a(u)(l) of this title, or
(xi) individuals described in section 1396a(z)(l) of this title,
but whose income and resources are insufficient to meet all of such cost—
(1) inpatient hospital services (other than services in an institution for mental
diseases);
(2) (A) outpatient hospital services, (B) consistent with State law permitting such
services, rural health clinic services (as defined in subsection (I )(1) of this section)
and any other ambulatory services which are offered by a rural health clinic (as
defined in subsection (l)(l) of this section) and which are otherwise included in the
plan, and (C) Federally-qualified health center services (as defined in subsection
(Z )(2) of this section) and any other ambulatory services offered by a Federallyqualified health center and which are otherwise included in the plan;
(3) other laboratory and X-ray services;
(4) (A) nursing facility services (other than services in an institution for mental
diseases) for individuals 21 years of age or older; (B) early and periodic screening,
diagnostic, and treatment services (as defined in subsection (r) of this section) for
individuals who are eligible under the plan and are under the age of 21; and (C)
family planning services and supplies furnished (directly or under arrangements
with others) to individuals of child-bearing age (including minors who can be
considered to be sexually active) who are eligible under the State plan and who
desire such services and supplies;
(5) (A) physicians' services furnished by a physician (as defined in section
1395x(r)(l) of this title), whether furnished in the office, the patient's home, a
hospital, or a nursing facility, or elsewhere, and (B) medical and surgical services
furnished by a dentist (described in section 1395x(r)(2) of this title) to the extent
such services may be performed under State law either by a doctor of medicine or
by a doctor of dental surgery or dental medicine and would be described in clause
(A) if furnished by a physician (as defined in section 1395x(r)(l) of this title);
(6) medical care, or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law,
furnished by licensed practitioners within the scope of their practice as defined by
State law;
(7) home health care services;
(8) private duty nursing services;
(9) clinic services furnished by or under the direction of a physician, without
regard to whether the clinic itself is administered by a physician, including such
services furnished outside the clinic by clinic personnel to an eligible individual who
does not reside in a permanent dwelling or does not have a fixed home or mailing
address;
(10) dental services;
(11) physical therapy and related services;
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(B) Coinsurance under subchapter XVIII of this chapter (including coinsurance
described in section 1395e of this title).
(C) Deductibles established under subchapter XVIII of this chapter (including
those described in section 1395e and section 1395Kb) of this title).
(D) The difference between the amount that is paid under section 1395Z(a) of this
title and the amount that would be paid under such section if any reference to "80
percent" therein were deemed a reference to "100 percent".
Such term also may include, at the option of a State, premiums for enrollment of a
qualified medicare beneficiary with an eligible organization under section 1395mm of this
title.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, in the case of a State
(other than the 50 States and the District of Columbia)—
(A) the requirement stated in section 1396a(a)(10)(E) of this title shall be
optional, and
(B) for purposes of paragraph (2), the State may substitute for the percent
provided under subparagraph (B) or 1396a(a)(10)(E)(iii)2 of such paragraph any
percent.
In the case of any State which is providing medical assistance to its residents under a
waiver granted under section 1315 of this title, the Secretary shall require the State to
meet the requirement of section 1396a(a)(10)(E) of this title in the same manner as the
State would be required to meet such requirement if the State had in effect a plan
approved under this subchapter.
(q) Qualified severely impaired individual
The term "qualified severely impaired individual" means an individual under age 65—
(1) who for the month preceding the first month to which this subsection applies
to such individual—
(A) received (i) a payment of supplemental security income benefits under
section 1382(b) of this title on the basis of blindness or disability, (ii) a
supplementary payment under section 1382e of this title or under section 212 of
Public Law 93-66 on such basis, (iii) a payment of monthly benefits under
section 1382h(a) of this title, or (iv) a supplementary payment under section
1382e(c)(3) of this title, and
(B) was eligible for medical assistance under the State plan approved under
this subchapter; and
(2) with respect to whom the Commissioner of Social Security determines that—
(A) the individual continues to be blind or continues to have the disabling
physical or mental impairment on the basis of which he was found to be under
a disability and, except for his earnings, continues to meet all non-disabilityrelated requirements for eligibility for benefits under subchapter XVI of this
chapter,
(B) the income of such individual would not, except for his earnings, be
equal to or in excess of the amount which would cause him to be ineligible for
payments under section 1382(b) of this title (if he were otherwise eligible for
such payments),
(C) the lack of eligibility for benefits under this subchapter would seriously
inhibit his ability to continue or obtain employment, and
(D) the individual's earnings are not sufficient to allow him to provide for
himself a reasonable equivalent of the benefits under subchapter XVI of this
chapter (including any federally administered State supplementary payments),
this subchapter, and publicly funded attendant care services (including personal
care assistance) that would be" available to him in the absence of such earnings.
In the case of an individual who is eligible for medical assistance pursuant to section
1382h(b) of this title in June, 1987, the individual shall be a qualified severely impaired
individual for so long as such individual meets the requirements of paragraph (2).
(r) Early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services
The term "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services" means the
following items and services:
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(1) Screening services—
(A) which are provided—
(i) at intervals which meet reasonable standards of medical and dental
practice, as determined by the State after consultation with recognized
medical and dental organizations involved in child health care and, with
respect to immunizations under subparagraph (B)(iii), in accordance with
the schedule referred to in section 1396s(c)(2)(B)(i) of this title for pediatric
vaccines, and
(ii) at such other intervals, indicated as medically necessary, to determine the existence of certain physical or mental illnesses or conditions;
and
(B) which shall at a minimum include—
(i) a comprehensive health and developmental history (including assessment of both physical and mental health development),
(ii) a comprehensive unclothed physical exam,
(iii) appropriate immunizations (according to the schedule referred to in
section 1396s(c)(2)(B)(i) of this title for pediatric vaccines) according to age
and health history,
(iv) laboratory tests (including lead blood level assessment appropriate
for age and risk factors), and
(v) health education (including anticipatory guidance).
(2) Vision services—
(A) which are provided—
(i) at intervals which meet reasonable standards of medical practice, as
determined by the State after consultation with recognized medical organizations involved in child health care, and
(ii) at such other intervals, indicated as medically necessary, to determine the existence of a suspected illness or condition; and
(B) which shall at a minimum include diagnosis and treatment for defects in
vision, including eyeglasses.
(3) Dental services—
(A) which are provided—
(i) at intervals which meet reasonable standards of dental practice, as
determined by the State after consultation with recognized dental organizations involved in child health care, and
(ii) at such other intervals, indicated as medically necessary, to determine the existence of a suspected illness or condition; and
(B) which shall at a minimum include relief of pain and infections, restoration of teeth, and maintenance of dental health.
(4) Hearing services—
(A) which are provided—
(i) at intervals which meet reasonable standards of medical practice, as
determined by the State after consultation with recognized medical organizations involved in child health care, and
(ii) at such other intervals, indicated as medically necessary, to determine the existence of a suspected illness or condition; and
(B) which shall at a minimum include diagnosis and treatment for defects in
hearing, including hearing aids.
(5) Such other necessary health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other
measures described in subsection (a) of this section to correct or ameliorate defects
and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening
services, whether or not such services are covered under the State plan.
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as limiting providers of early and periodic
screening, diagnostic, and treatment services to providers who are qualified to provide
all of the items and services described in the previous sentence or as preventing a
provider that is qualified under the plan to furnish one or more (but not all) of such
items or services from being qualified to provide such items and services as part of early
and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services. The Secretary shall, not
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UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
HEALTH
R410. HEALTH CARE FINANCING.
Current through December 1, 1998
R410-14. Division of Health Care Financing Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP
Applicants, Recipients and Providers, and Non-Medicaid/UMAP Nursing Home Residents as per "OBRA"
Preadmission Screening and Annual Resident Review (PASARR) Determinations/Resident Rights Requirements.
R410-14-1. Policy Statement.
(1) It is the policy of the Division of Health Care Financing to resolve disputes at the lowest level. The following
rules are not meant to foreclose the Division's preference for informal resolutions through open discussion and
negotiation between the Division, and applicants, recipients and providers, and all other statutorily/regulatorily
interested parties.
R410-14-2. Administrative Hearing Procedures Provide.
(1) HEARING PROVISION.
(a) Hearing Responsibility.
(i) Classification of Hearing.
(A) Formal Hearings. In accordance with Section 1902(a)(3) of the Social Security Act, 42 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Part 431, Subpart E, Sections 26-1-4.1 and 26-23-2, and 63-46b-l, et seq., all Title XIX
(Medicaid)/Utah Medical Assistance Program (UMAP) recipients or providers (and applicants under certain
circumstances) aggrieved by any action or inaction of the Department of Health (DOH), Division of Health Care
Financing (DHCF), will be given an opportunity for a hearing upon written request. All hearings before the
Division of Health Care Financing except as otherwise set forth shall be conducted as a formal hearing.
(B) PASARR Hearings. As provided by Section 4211 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987
(OBRA), which amended Title XIX of the Social Security Act by adding Section 1919 to the "Act," all residents
and potential residents of a nursing facility (whether Medicaid eligible or otherwise) who disagree with the preadmission screening and appropriateness of placement decision made by the Division of Health Care Financing,
shall be given an opportunity for a hearing upon written request. All such PASARR hearings as set forth above
shall be conducted as a formal hearing.
(C) Nurse Aide Registry Hearings. As provided by Section 4211 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1987 (OBRA), which amended Title XIX of the Social Security Act by adding Section 1919 to the "Act," all
nurse aides employed by a certified nursing facility who have successfully completed and passed the nurse aide
training and competency evaluation program, or both, shall be identified on a nurse aide registry. In addition,
such nurse aides shall be subject to investigation upon allegations of resident abuse, neglect, or misappropriation
of resident property. The Division of Health Care Financing or its designated agents shall be responsible for
investigating such complaints. Before a substantiated claim can be entered into the registry, the nurse aide, upon
written request, shall be entitled to a hearing to be conducted by the Division of Health Care Financing or its
designated agents. All such nurse aide registry hearings as set forth above shall be conducted as a formal hearing.
(D) Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF), Intermediate Care Facility (ICF) or Intermediate Care Facility/Mentally
Retarded (ICF/MR) Hearings. As provided by 42 CFR 431, Subpart D the Division of Health Care Financing
must, for any SNF, ICF and ICF/MR, provide for appeals procedures that, as a minimum, satisfy the
Copr. © West 1999 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

0000039

UTADCR410-14

Page 42

requirements of 42 CFR 431.153 through 431.155. Such hearings shall be conducted as a formal hearing in
accordance with R410-14- 2(l)(a)(i)(A).
(E) Informal Hearings. "Residents' Rights Hearings." As provided by Section 4211 of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA), which amended Title XIX of the Social Security Act by adding Section 1919
to said "Act," all residents of a nursing facility (whether Medicaid eligible or otherwise) have been granted certain
specific "residents' rights" and may be aggrieved by action or inaction of a nursing facility in the meeting of those
rights. Responsibility for enforcing nursing home compliance with the residents' rights requirement rests with the
Division of Health Care Financing. All "resident rights" hearings shall be conducted as an informal hearing.
(ii) A hearing is not required and will not be granted to an applicant, recipient or provider if the sole issue is a
federal or state law or policy requiring an automatic change in covered services adversely affecting some or all
applicants, recipients or providers (42 CFR 431.220).
(b) Applicability.
(i) EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED HEREIN, THESE PROVISIONS ONLY APPLY TO TITLE XIX MEDICAID/
UMAP RECIPIENTS OR PROVIDERS. These rules do not apply to initial applications for medical assistance. A
Medicaid/UMAP applicant who has been denied eligibility for medical assistance through the local Office of
Community Operations (OCO), Assistance Payments Administration (APA), Department of Social Services
(DSS), must submit a written request for an eligibility determination hearing to: The Department of Social
Services, Office of Administrative Hearings, P. O. Box 45500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500 or the applicant
may deliver the written request in person to the local OCO.
(c) Eligibility Hearing for both Non-Medical Assistance AND Medical Assistance.
(i) If eligibility for a non-medical assistance program in addition to Medicaid/UMAP is at issue, the Medicaid/
UMAP eligibility determination hearing shall be conducted by the Department of Social Services through the
Office of Administrative Hearings. Requests for such hearings shall be sent to the address in R410-14-2(l)(b)(i).
All such hearings shall be conducted according to DSS hearing rules. DSS shall propose a recommended decision
concerning the medical assistance issue only and shall submit it to the Executive Director of DOH or his
designated representative for agency review. Thereafter the recommended decision shall be handled in accordance
with Sections 63-46b-12 and 63-46b-15.
(d) Eligibility Hearing For Medical Assistance Only.
(i) All requests for hearings to consider eligibility as to medical assistance only, shall be forwarded by DSS to
DHCF. A formal hearing in accordance with the hearing procedures herein shall be conducted by DHCF.
(e) Definitions.
(i) The definitions of the Utah Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), Section 63-46b-l, et seq., as set forth in
Section 63-46b-2 apply to this rule.
(ii) "Action" means a denial of Medicaid/UMAP eligibility as regards an applicant; denial, termination,
suspension, or reduction of Medicaid/UMAP covered services in the case of recipients; or, a reduction or denial
of reimbursement for such services, findings of licensing survey deficiencies requiring a Plan of Correction,
failure of DHCF to accept a Plan of Correction required by licensing, or other sanctions as set forth in "DHCF
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES", R414-22, in the case of providers.
(iii) "Aggrieved Person" means any applicant, recipient or provider aggrieved by any action or inaction of
DHCF.
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(iv) "Date of Action" means the date on which a denial of eligibility for, termination, suspension or reduction of
Medicaid/UMAP covered services becomes effective, in the case of applicants or recipients; or, in the case of
providers the date on which:
(A) A reduction or denial or reimbursement or sanction becomes effective;
(B) Notice is given of licensing survey deficiencies; or
(C) Notice is given that DHCF will not accept a plan of correction of survey deficiencies required by licensing.
(v) "Division Director" means the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing of the Utah Department of
Health or his designated and authorized representative.
(vi) "Executive Director" means the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Health or his designated and
authorized representative.
(vii) "Formal Hearing" means a hearing before a hearing officer, conducted in accordance with Title 63,
Chapter 46b.
(viii) "Informal Hearing" means a hearing before a hearing officer, conducted in accordance with Sections
63-46b-5, and Section 63-46b-ll through 63-46b-15. Except as by implication and context, no further specific
procedural or appellate references regarding an "Informal Hearing" shall be had in this present rule, as Sections
63-46b-5, and Section 63-46b-ll through 63-46b-15 are to be controlling, except specifically R410-14-2(l)(e)(xi),
below, as to the definition of "Request for an Informal Hearing".
(ix) "Notice" means a written statement of the action DHCF intends to take, the reasons for the intended action,
the specific regulations that support (or the change in federal or state law that requires) the action, the right to a
hearing when applicable, the procedure to obtain a hearing, and an explanation of the circumstances under which
Medicaid/UMAP benefits or reimbursement will be continued if a hearing is requested.
(x) "Request for a Formal Hearing" means a clear expression in writing which meets the criteria of a "Request
for Agency Action" as set forth by Section 63-46b-3 by an aggrieved person or authorized representative.
(xi) "Request for an Informal Hearing" means a clear expression in writing which meets the criteria of a
"Request for Agency Action" as set forth by Section 63-46b-3 by an aggrieved person or authorized
representative.
(f) Notice.
(i) When Notice Required.
(A) Each individual who is affected by an adverse action taken by DHCF will be given advance notice of such
action in accordance with R410-14- 2(l)(f)(iii).
(ii) A notice under this section must contain:
(A) a statement of the action DHCF intends to take;
(B) the date the intended action takes effect;
(C) the reasons for the intended action;
(D) the specific regulations that support, or the change in federal or state law or policy, that requires the action;
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(E) the aggrieved person's right to request a formal hearing before DHCF, when applicable, and the method by
which such hearing may be obtained from DHCF;
(F) a statement that the aggrieved person may represent himself or use legal counsel, relative, friend or other
spokesman at the formal hearing; and,
(G) an explanation of the circumstances under which Medicaid/UMAP coverage or reimbursement will be
continued if a formal hearing is timely requested.
(iii) DHCF will mail an advance notice at least ten calendar days before the date of the intended action EXCEPT
as noted below:
(A) DHCF may mail a notice not later than the date of action if:
DHCF has factual information confirming the death of a recipient/provider;
DHCF receives a clear written statement signed by a recipient/provider that:
he no longer wishes services or reimbursement, or
gives information that requires termination or reduction of services or reimbursement and indicates that he
understands that this must be the result of supplying that information;
the recipient has been admitted to an institution where he is ineligible under the State Plan for further services;
the recipient/provider's whereabouts are unknown and the Post Office returns DHCF mail directed to him
indicating no forwarding address;
DHCF establishes the fact that the recipient has been accepted for Medicaid/UMAP services by another local
jurisdiction, State, Territory or Commonwealth;
a change in the level of medical care is prescribed by the recipient's physician; or
a termination, suspension or reduction of Medicaid/UMAP covered services or reimbursement is necessitated by
an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare.
(B) DHCF may shorten the period of advance mailed notice to five days before the date of action if:
DHCF has facts indicating that action should be taken because of probable fraud by the applicant/recipient/
provider; and
the facts have been verified, by affidavit, if possible.
(g) Request for Formal Hearing and Agency Response.
(i) Formal hearings are held for "medical assistance only" issues. If an aggrieved person's request for an
eligibility hearing concerns both non- medical assistance and medical assistance, he should refer to R410-142(l)(c)(i), above. An aggrieved person may request a formal hearing within the following deadlines, depending
upon the type of request:
(A) An aggrieved UMAP or Medicaid provider may request a formal hearing within 30 calendar days from the
date written notice is issued or mailed, whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or inaction.
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(B) An aggrieved Medicaid applicant or recipient may request a formal hearing regarding eligibility for "medical
assistance only" within 90 calendar days from the date written notice is issued or mailed, whichever is later, by
DHCF of an action or intended action.
(C) An aggrieved UMAP applicant or recipient may request a formal hearing regarding eligibility within 90
calendar days from the date written notice is issued or mailed, whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or
intended action.
(D) An aggrieved UMAP or Medicaid applicant or recipient may request a formal hearing regarding scope of
service within 30 calendar days from the date written notice is issued or mailed, whichever is later, by DHCF of
an action or intended action.
(ii) Failure to submit a timely request for a formal hearing will constitute a waiver of a person's formal hearing
or pre-hearing rights. A request for a hearing shall be in writing, shall be dated, and shall explain the reasons for
which the hearing is requested. An aggrieved person may use the hearing request form which is attached to all
negative eligibility action notices, or the form which is provided in Attachment "A," which is entitled "Requests
for Hearing/Agency Action." DHCF will provide copies of the form in Attachment A to all interested persons.
(iii) The address for submitting a "Request for Hearing/Agency Action" for: (a) Medicaid or UMAP providers;
and (b) Medicaid or UMAP scope of service hearings is as follows:
Division of Health Care Financing
Attention: Formal Hearings
P.O. Box 16580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580
(iv) The address for submitting a "Request for Hearing/Agency Action for Medicaid and UMAP applicants
regarding eligibility issues is:
The Department of Social Services
Office of Administrative Hearings
P.O. Box 45500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500
(v) Requests for formal hearing will be docketed and scheduled within 30 calendar days. DHCF as respondent
shall schedule a hearing or begin negotiations in the matter in writing within 30 days of the date of issuance of the
request for formal hearing or agency action.
(h) DOH or DHCF may deny or dismiss a request for a formal hearing if:
(i) The aggrieved person withdraws the request in writing;
(ii) The aggrieved person fails to appear at a scheduled hearing without good cause; or
(iii) The provider fails to allow DHCF access to its records pursuant to R410-14-3.
(iv) Reinstatement/Continuation of Services.
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(A) DHCF may reinstate services for recipients or suspend any adverse action for providers as defined in
R410-14-2(l)(e)(ii) if an aggrieved person requests a formal hearing not more than ten calendar days after the date
of action.
(B) DHCF must reinstate or continue services for recipients or suspend adverse actions for providers until a
decision is rendered after a formal hearing if:
adverse action is taken without giving the ten day advanced mailed notice to a recipient/provider in all
circumstances where such advance notice is required;
in those circumstances where advance notice is not required, as set forth in R410-14-2(l)(f)(iii)(A), the
aggrieved person requests a formal hearing within ten calendar days following the date the adverse action notice is
mailed; or
DHCF determines that the action resulted from other than the application of federal or state law or policy.
(C) DHCF may proceed with its intended action if: the aggrieved person withdraws his request for either a
formal hearing in writing; or, the aggrieved person prolongs the hearing process without good cause; or, a
recipient's whereabouts are unknown, as indicated by the return of agency mail directed to him which is not
forwardable.
(j) Formal Hearing
(i) A request for a formal hearing must be made to the Division of Health Care Financing, 288 North 1460
West, P. O. Box 16580, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580, Attention: "Formal Hearings/
(ii) Notice of Formal Hearing.
(A) DHCF shall notify the aggrieved person or his attorney, in writing, of the date, time and place of the
hearing. Notice shall be mailed not less than ten calendar days before the scheduled date of the formal hearing.
(iii) Form of Papers. All papers to be filed in a formal hearing shall:
(A) Be typewritten or legibly hand-written;
(B) Bear a caption clearly showing the title of the hearing;
(C) Bear the docket number, if any;
(D) Be dated and signed by the party or his authorized representative and shall contain his address and telephone
number; and
(E) Consist of an original and two copies filed with DHCF.
(iv) Hearings may be delayed until the requirements of this section are met.
(v) Service.
(A) The party filing papers and documents shall serve them upon all parties to the formal hearing. Proof of
service shall be filed with DHCF.
(B) Service shall be personally delivered or by mail, properly addressed with postage prepaid, one copy to each
party entitled thereto. When a party is represented by an attorney, service upon the attorney shall be determined as
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sufficient service upon the party or parties.
(C) Proof of service shall be by certificate, affidavit or acknowledgment.
(D) Wherever notice by DHCF is required, notification shall be effective upon the date of first class mailing to a
party's residence or business address.
(E) In addition to the methods set forth in these rules, a party may be served in any manner permitted by law.
(vi) As permitted by Section 63-46b-10, intervention will be permitted provided the following requirements are
met:
(A) Persons desiring to intervene in a formal hearing must petition for leave to intervene at least seven days
before the scheduled hearing, unless otherwise permitted by the hearing officer.
(B) The petition must contain a clear and concise statement of the direct and substantial interest of the person
seeking leave to intervene in the hearing.
(C) Persons seeking affirmative relief shall state the basis of such relief.
(D) Other parties to the hearing must have an opportunity to support or oppose intervention.
(E) The hearing officer may grant leave to intervene subject to such reasonable conditions as he may prescribe.
An intervenor may be dismissed from the hearing if it appears that he has no direct or substantial interest in the
hearing.
(vii) Conduct of Hearing.
(A) Formal hearings shall be conducted by an impartial hearing officer who is appointed by DOH. The hearing
officer shall be empowered with such authority as granted by Section 63-46b-l, et seq., except as may be limited
by these rules. No hearing officer shall have been directly involved in the initial determination of the action in
question.
(B) All formal hearings shall be conducted only after adequate written notice of the hearing has been served on
all parties setting forth the time, date and place of the hearing.
(C) Testimony shall be taken under oath or affirmation administered by the hearing officer.
(D) Each party shall have the right to: call and examine parties and witnesses; introduce exhibits; question
opposing witnesses and parties on any matter relevant to the issue even though the matter was not covered in the
direct examination; impeach any witness regardless of which party first called him to testify; and rebut the
evidence against him.
(E) The rules of evidence as applied in civil actions in the courts of this state shall be generally followed in the
hearings. Any relevant evidence may be admitted. Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of
supplementing or explaining other evidence, but shall not be sufficient by itself to support a finding unless it
would be admissible over objection in civil actions. The hearing officer shall give effect to the rules of privilege
recognized by law. Irrelevant, immaterial and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded.
(F) The hearing officer may order the taking of interrogatories and depositions and assess the expense to the
requesting party if the hearing officer determined such to be proper.
(G) The hearing officer may question any party or witness and may admit any evidence he believes is relevant or
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material.
(H) The hearing officer shall control the taking of evidence in a manner best determined to be best suited to
ascertain the facts and safeguard the rights of the parties. The hearing officer shall explain the issues and the order
in which evidence will be received.
(I) A party has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence whatever facts it must establish to
sustain its position. A provider always has the burden of proof to show that services were, in fact, rendered as
billed.
(J) The burden of proof as to a particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be
required in the absence of further evidence.
(viii) Ex Parte Communications
(A) Except as otherwise provided below, ex parte communications are prohibited.
(B) The hearing officer shall decline to listen to or accept any communication offered in violation of this rule and
shall explain to the offeror that any communication received off the record and in violation of this rule must be
made a part of the record and furnished to all parties.
(C) This rule shall NOT apply to: the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law; or communications
concerning status of the hearing and uncontested procedural matters.
(ix) Continuances or Further Hearings
(A) The hearing officer may continue a formal hearing to another time or place, or order a further hearing on
his own motion or upon the showing of good cause, at the request of any party.
(B) Where the hearing officer determines that additional evidence is necessary for the proper determination of
the case, he may at his discretion: continue the hearing to a later date and order the party to produce additional
evidence; or close the hearing and hold the record open in order to permit the introduction of additional
documentary evidence. Any evidence so submitted shall be made available to both parties and each party shall
have the opportunity for rebuttal.
(C) Written notice of the time and place of a continued or further hearing shall be given in accordance with
R410-14-2(l)(j)(ii)(A), except that when a continuance is ordered during a hearing and adequate oral notice is
given.
(x) Record
A complete record of all formal hearings shall be made. The testimony shall be electronically recorded or
memorialized by court reporter. The recording or memorialization shall be transcribed if requested by a party to
the hearing. The requesting party shall pay the costs of transcription and for copying costs. At the conclusion of
the formal hearing, the complete record of the hearing will be maintained in a secured area and shall be
considered the sole property of DHCF. DHCF or its designated agent will retain electronic recordings/
memorialization of formal hearings for a period of one year. Written records and documents will be retained for a
period not to exceed three years.
(xi) Proposed Decision and Final Agency Review
(A) At the conclusion of the formal hearing, the hearing officer shall take the matter under advisement and shall
submit to the Executive Director of DOH a proposed decision, based on the evidence and testimony introduced at
Copr. © West 1999 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

0000046

UT ADC R410-14

Page 49

the hearing.
(B) The proposed decision shall be in writing and shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(C) The Executive Director of DOH may: adopt the proposed decision, or any portion of the decision; reject the
proposed decision, or any portion thereof, and make his own independent determination based upon the record; or
remand the matter to the hearing officer to take additional evidence; and the hearing officer thereafter shall submit
to the Executive Director of DOH a new proposed decision.
(D) Review by the Executive Director constitutes agency review and final administration action, and is subject to
judicial review in accordance with the procedures set forth in R410-14-2(l)(j)(xiii).
(E) The aggrieved person or his representative shall be notified of the final administrative action and the
aggrieved person's right to judicial review of the action.
(F) When the final administrative action is favorable to the aggrieved person, DHCF shall promptly take
corrective action.
(G) Subject to provisions for safeguarding confidential information, all hearing decisions shall be kept on file for
public inspection.
(xii) Agency Review.
(A) Reconsideration. Section 63-46b-13 applies.
(xiii) Judicial Review
(A) Judicial review of a final agency action may be secured by the aggrieved party by filing a petition in the
Utah Court of Appeals within 30 days after issuance of the Executive Director's final administrative action. The
petition shall be served upon the Executive Director and shall state the grounds upon which review is sought. The
Executive Director shall file with his Answer certified documents, papers, transcripts of all testimony taken in the
matter, recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing officer and the final administrative
action of the Executive Director.
(B) Judicial review of final administrative action is governed by Section 63-46b-16 and Section 63-46b-l, and
Section 78-2a-3.
R410-14-3. Discovery,
(1) DISCOVERY PROVISIONS
(a) The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to these proceedings and no formal discovery except as
set forth hereinafter shall be permitted.
(b) Unless otherwise limited by order of the hearing officer, the scope of discovery in formal adjudicative
proceedings shall be as follows:
(i) Review of Applicant/Recipient and Provider Records
(A) DHCF shall be permitted to review all records which are pertinent to the hearing which are in the custody or
control of the applicant or recipient and their health care providers. DHCF shall give at least three days' written
notice to the custodian of such document(s).
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Health Care Financing,

R414.
Health, Health Care Financing, Coverage and
Reimbursement Policy.
R414-1. Utah Medicaid Program,
R414-1-1. Introduction and Authority.
(1) This rule fis the general rule that denotes! generally
characterizes the scope of the Medicaid Program in Utah, and
defines all of the provisions necessary to administer the
program.
(2) The rule is authorized by Title XIX of the Social
Security Act, and Sections 26-1-5, 26-18-2.1, 26-18-2.3,
UCA.
R414-1-2. Definitions.
The following definitions are used throughout the rules of
the Division:
(1) "Act" means the federal Social Security Act.
(2)
"Applicant" means any person who requests
assistance under the medical programs available through the
Division.
(3) "Categorically needy" means aged, blind or disabled
individuals or families and children:
(a) who are otherwise eligible for Medicaid and who
meet thefinancialeligibility requirements for AFDC, SSI, or
an optional State supplement or are considered under section
1619(b) of the federal Social Security Act to be SSI recipients;
or
(b) whose categorical eligibility is protected by statute.
(4) "Code of Federal Regulations" (CFR) means the
publication by the Office of die Federal Register, specifically
Title 42, used to govern the administration of the Medicaid
Program.
(5) "Client" means a person the Division or its duly
constituted agent has determined to be eligible for assistance
under the Medicaid program.
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(6) "Department" means the Department of Health.
(7) "Director" means the director of the Division.
(8) "Division" means the Division of Health Care
Financing within the Department.
(9) "Emergency medical condition" means a medical
condition showing acute symptoms of sufficient severity that
the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably

be expected to result in;
ftri placing the patient's health in serious ieonardv:
(b) serious impairment to bodily functions:
(c) serious dysfunction of anv bodifv organ or part: or

(d) death.
(101 "Emergency service" means immediate medical
attention and service performed to treat an emergency medical
condition. Immediate medical attention is treatment rendered
within 24 hours of the onset of symptoms or within 24 hours

pf diagnosis.
(\\) "Emergency Services Only Program" means a
health program designed to cover a specific range of
emergency services.
([9]J2) "Executive Director" means the executive
director of the Department.
(1[0]2) "InterOual- means the InterQual Medical Review
Criteria and System, fthatla comprehensive, clinically based,
patient focused medical review criteria and system developed
by InterQual Inc.[, who is on contract with the Division, and
is adopted and incorporated by reference?]

£141

"Medicaid agency* means the Department of

Health.
OfflS "Medical assistance program" or "Medicaid
program" means the state program for medical assistance for
persons who are eligible under the state plan adopted pursuant
to Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act; as
implemented by Title 26, Chapter 18, UCA.
(1[2]£) "Medical or hospital assistance" means services
furnished or payments made to or on behalf of recipients under
medical programs available through the Division.
(1[9]2) "Medically needy" means aged, blind, or
disabled individuals or families and children who are otherwise
eligible for Medicaid, who are not categorically needy, and
whose income and resources are within limits set under the
Medicaid State Plan.
(l[4]g) "Provider" means any person, individual or
corporation, institution or organization, qualified to perform
services available under the Medicaid program and who has
entered into a written contract with the Medicaid program.
(1[5]2) "Recipient" means a person who has received
medical or hospital assistance under the Medicaid program.
([*6]2£D "Undocumented alien" means an alien who is
not recognized by Immigration and Naturalization Services as
being lawfully present in the United States.
R414-1-3. Single State Agency.
The Utah Department of Health is the Single State
Agency designated to administer or supervise the
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administration of the Medicaid program under Title XIX of the
federal Social Security Act.[ All references to "the Medicaid
agency" mean the agency named in this section.]
R414-1-4. Medical Assistance Unit.
Within the Utah Department of Health, the Division of
Health Care Financing has been designated as the medical
assistance unit.
R414-1-5. State Plan.
As a condition for receipt of federal funds under title XK
of the Act, the Utah Department of Health must submit a State
Plan contract to the federal government for the medical
assistance program, and agree to administer the program in
accordance with the provisions of the State Plan, the
requirements of Titles XI and XIX of the Act, and ail
applicable federal regulations and other official issuances of
the United States Department of Health and Human Services.
A copy of the State Plan is available for public inspection at
the Division's offices during regular business hours.
R414-1-6. Services Available.
(1) Medical or hospital services available under the
Medical Assistance Program are generally limited by federal
guidelines as set forth under Title XIX of the federal Social
Security Act and Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR).
(2) The following services provided in the State Plan are
available to both the categorically needy and medically needy:
(a) inpatient hospital services, with the exception of those
services provided in an institution for mental diseases;
(b) outpatient hospital services and rural health clinic
services;
(c) other laboratory and x-ray services;
(d) skilled nursing facility services, other than services
in an institution for mental diseases, for individuals 21 years
of age or older;
(e) early and periodic screening and diagnoses of
individuals under 21 years of age, and treatment of conditions
foundA are provided in accordance with federal requirements;
(f) family planning services and supplies for individuals
of child-bearing age;
(g) physician's services, whether furnished in the office,
the patient's home, a hospital, a skilled nursing facility, or
elsewhere;
(h) podiatrist's services;
(i) optometrist's services;
(j) psychologist's services;
Art interpreter's services:
([k]D home health services:
(i) intermittent or part-time nursing services provided by
a home health agency;
(ii) home health aide services by a home health agency;
and
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(iii) medical supplies, equipment, and appliances suitable
for use in the home;
(fflm) private duty nursing services for children under
age 21;
([m]n) clinic services;
([n]fi) dental services;
(Wfi) physical therapy and related services;
(Wo) services for individuals with speech, hearing, and
language disorders furnished by or under the supervision of a
speech pathologist or audiologist;
(Mr) prescribed drugs, dentures, and prosthetic devices
and eyeglasses prescribed by a physician skilled in diseases of
the eye or by an optometrist;
(Ms) other diagnostic, screening, preventive, and
rehabilitative services other than those provided elsewhere in
the State Plan;
(Ml) services for individuals age 65 or older in
institutions for mental diseases:
(i) inpatient hospital services for individuals age 65 or
older in institutions for mental diseases;
(ii) skilled nursing services for individuals age 65 or
older in institutions for mental diseases; and
(iii) intermediate care facility services for individuals age
65 or older in institutions for mental diseases;
(WlO intermediate care facility services, other than[
sueh] services in an institution for mental diseasesfr]. These
services are for [personalindividuals determined, in accordance
with section 1902(a)(31)(A) of the Social Security Act, to be
in need of fsueh]this care, including those services furnished
in a public institution [or a distinct part thereof ]for the
mentally retarded or for [persons!individuals with related
conditions;
(My)
inpatient psychiatric facility services for
individuals under 22 years of age;
([v]wj nurse-midwife services;
([w]20 family or pediatric nurse practitioner services;
(My) hospice care in accordance with section 1905(o) of
the Social Security Act;
([y]z) case management services in accordance with
section 1905(a)(19) or section 1915(g) of the Social Security
Act;
(MM) extended services to pregnant womena [including
Ipregnancv-related services, faftd-lpostpartum services for 60
days[ after the pregnancy ends], and[ including] additional
services for any other medical conditions that may complicate
pregnancy[-with increases of service];
([fttt]bk) ambulatory prenatal care for pregnant women
furnished during a presumptive eligibility period by a qualified
provider in accordance with section 1920 of the Social Security
Act; and
([bb]££) other medical care and other types of remedial
care recognized under state law, specified by the Secretary of
the United States Department of Health and Human Services,
pursuant to 42 CFR 440.60 and [42-€Ffc-]440.170, including:
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(i) medical or remedial [care or Jservicesfc] provided by
licensed practitioners, other than physician's services, within
the scope of practice as defined by state law;
(ii) transportation services;
(iii) skilled nursing facility services for patients under 21
years of age;
(iv) emergency hospital services; and
(v) personal care services in the recipient's home,
prescribed in [accordance -with -]a plan of treatment and
provided by a qualified person* under the supervision of a
registered nurse.
R414-1-7. [Undocumented ]Aliens.
(1) Certain qualified aliens described in Title IV of
Public Law 104-193 may be eligible for the Medicaid
program, All pther alien? are prohibited from receiving nonemergency services, as described in Section 1903fv> of
the[Undocumcntcd aliens arc eligible for emergency services
only, as noted in the] Social Security Act[, Section 1903(v)],
which is adopted and incorporated by reference^—Nencmcrgeney—services—are—not—a Medicaid—benefit—for
undocumented aliens.]
(2) Aliens who are prohibited from receiving nonemergency servicesfAn undocumented alien eligible under the
Emergency Services Only Program] will have "Emergency
Services Only Program" printed on fhtsltheir Medical
Identification Cards, as noted in R414-3A.
R414-1-8. Statewide Basis.
The [M]medical [Assistance [Pfcrogram is state;
administered and[-»-m] operat£$[ten] on a statewide basis in
accordance with[ all requirements of] 42 CFR 431.50.
R414-1-9. Medical Care Advisory Committee.
There is a[n] Medical Care felAdvisorv [e]£ommittee
that advises the Medicaid agency directorfto the Medicaid
agency director] on health and medical care servicesx[-and]
The committee is established in accordance with [and meeting
all the requirements of ]42 CFR 431.12.
R414-1-10. Discrimination Prohibited.
In accordance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 70b), and the
regulations at 45 CFR Parts 80 and 84, the Medicaid agency
assures that no individual shall be subjected to discrimination
under the plan on the grounds of race, color, gender, national
origin, or handicap.
R414-1-11. Administrative Hearings.
The Medicaid agency has a system of administrative
hearings for medical providers and dissatisfied applicants,
clients^ and recipients that meets all the requirements of 42
CFR Part 431, Subpart E.
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R414-1-12. Utilization Review.
m In order to approve or deny payment of claims.
[T]the Medicaid agency shall use InterQual [medical review
criteria and system ]to determine medical necessity^] and
appropriateness of services. The InterQual Medical Review
Criteria and System, published bv InterQual. Inc.. January.
1997. is adopted and incorporated bv reference.

(2) InterQual shall not apply to services that are;
(a) excluded as a Medicaid benefit bv rule;
(b) provided in an intensive physical rehabilitation center

as described in R414-2P; or
(c) organ transplant services as described in R414-10A.
In these three exceptions, or where InterQual is silent, the
Medicaid agency shall approve or deny claims based upon
appropriate administrative rules or its own criteria as
incorporated in provider contracts that incorporate the
Medicaid Provider Manuals.f. and subsequent approval or
non approval of payment for services, except for services that
arc not a Medicaid benefit, or services provided in an intensive
physical rehabilitation center as described in R414-2B, or for
organ transplant services.—In these exceptions, the agency
shall use appropriate administrative rules or its own criteria as
listed in the Medicaid Provider Manuals.]
R414-1-13. Provider Agreements.
All requirements of 42 CFR 431.107 are met with respect
to agreements between the Medicaid agency and each provider
furnishing services under the plan.
R414-M4. Utilization Control.
The Medicaid agency has implemented TAIa statewide
program of surveillance and utilization control[ has been
implemented] that safeguards against unnecessary or
inappropriate use of Medicaid services available under the
plan. The plan also safeguardsftmdl against excess payments,
and[-that] assesses the quality of services. The program meets
ihe_requirements of 42 CFR Part 456[-are-met].
R414-1-15. Medicaid Fraud.
The Medicaid agency has established and will maintain
methods, criteria, and procedures that meet all requirements
of 42 CFR 455.13 through 455.21 for prevention and control
of program fraud and abuse.
R414-M6. Confidentiality.
[Uftder-s]£tate statute, Title 63, Chapter 2, and Section
26-1-17.5, [whieh-]impose[s] legal sanctions^] and provide
safeguards! are provided] that restrict the use or disclosure of
information concerning applicants, clients* and recipients to
purposes directly connected with the administration of the
plan.
All other requirements of 42 CFR Part 431, Subpart F are
met.
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R414-1-17. Eligibility Determinations.
Determinations of eligibility for Medicaid under the plan
are made by the Division of Health Care Financing and the
Utah Department of WorkforcefHttmanl Services. There is a
written agreement between the Utah Department of Health and
the Utah Department of WorkforcefHttman] Services. The
agreement defines the relationships and respective
responsibilities of the agencies.
R414-1-18. Professional Standards Review Organization,
All other provisions of the State Plan are administered by
the Medicaid agency or its agents according to written
contract* except for those functions for which final authority
has been granted to a Professional Standards Review
Organization under Title XI of the Act.
R414-1-19. Timeliness in Eligibility Determinations.
The Medicaid agency meets all timeliness requirements
of 42 CFR Part 435, Subpart JA for processing applications,
determining eligibility* and furnishing Medicaid.
R414-1-20. Residency.
Medicaid is famished to eligible individuals who are
residents of the State under 42 CFR 435.403.
R414-1-21. Out-of-state Services.
Medicaid services are available to eligible residents of the
state who are temporarily in another state. Reimbursement for
out-of-state services shall be provided in accordance with 42
CFR 431.52fia furnished under the conditions specified in 42
CFR 431.52 to an eligible individual who is a resident of the
state while the individual is in another state, to the same extent
that Medicaid is furnished to residents in the state].
R414-1-22. Retroactive Coverage.
Individuals are entitled to Medicaid services under the
plan during the three months preceding the month of
application^] if they were, or would have been, eligible at that
time.
R414-1-23. Freedom of Choice of Provider.
Unless an exception under 42 CFR 431.55 applies, any
individual eligible under the plan may obtain Medicaid
services from any institution, pharmacy, person, or
organization that is qualified to perform the services and has
entered into a Medicaid provider contract, including an
organization that provides these services or arranges for their
availability on a prepayment basis.
R414-1-24. Availability of Program Manuals and Policy
Issuances.
In accordance with 42 CFR 431.18. the state office, local
offices, and all district offices of the Department maintain
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These manuals, policy

issuances, and rules are available for examination and, upon
request, are available to individuals for review, study, or
reproductionrProgram manuals and other policy issuances that
affect recipients, providers, and the public, including the
Medicaid agency's rules governing eligibility, need, and
amount of assistance, recipient right3 and responsibilities, and
services offered by the agency arc maintained in the state
office and in each local and district office for examination and,
upon request, arc available to individuals for review, study, or
reproduction. All requirements of 42 CFR 431.18 arc met].
R414-1-25. General Rule Format.
The following format is used generally throughout the
rules of the Division. Section headings as indicated and the
following general definitions [thereunder ]are for guidance
only. The section headings are not part of the rule content
itself. In certain instances, this format may not be appropriate
and will not be implemented due to the nature of the subject
matter of a specific rule.
(1) Introduction and Authority. A concise statement as
to what Medicaid service is covered by the rule, and a listing
of specific federal statutes and regulations and state statutes
that authorize or require the rule.
(2) Definitions. Definitions that have special meaning to
the particular rule.
(3) Client Eligibility. Categories of Medicaid clients
eligible for the service covered by the rule: Categorically
Needy or Medically Needy or both. Conditions precedent to
the client's obtaining coverage such as age limitations or
otherwise.
(4) Program Access Requirements. Conditions precedent
external to the client's obtaining service^ such as type of
certification needed from attending physician, whether
available only in an inpatient setting or otherwise.
(5) Service Coverage. Detail of specific services
available under the rule, including limitations^ such as number
of procedures in a given period of time or otherwise.
(6) Prior Authorization. As necessary, a description of
the procedures for obtaining prior authorization for services
available under the particular rule.
However, prior
authorization must not be used as a substitute for regulatory
practice that should be in rule.
(7) Other Sections. As necessary under the particular
rule, additional sections may be indicated. [Include o]Qther
sections incJudfifte-detetl] regulatory language that does not fit
into sections (1) through (5).
KEY: medicaid
1997

26-1-5
26-18-1

0000052

DAR File No. 18959

NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE

This filing was published in the
May 15,1997, issue, Vol. 97, No.
10, of the Utah State Bulletin on
pages 92-106.

288 North 1460 West
Box 142906
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-2906, or
at the Division of Administrative Rules.
DIRECT QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS FILING TO:

Dr. John Hylen at the above address, by phone at (801)
538-6019, by FAX at (801) 538-6099, or by Internet Email at jhylen@email.state.ut.us.

* * * * * * *

Health, Health Care Financing,
Coverage and Reimbursement
Policy

INTERESTED PERSONS MAY PRESENT THEIR VIEWS ON THIS
FILING BY SUBMITTING WRITTEN COMMENTS TO THE ADDRESS
ABOVE NO LATER THAN 5 : 0 0 P.M. ON 0 6 / 1 6 / 9 7 .
THIS FILING MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE ON: 06/17/97

R414-10A

AUTHORIZED BY: Rod Betit, Executive Director

Transplant Services Standards
NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE
(Amendment)
DARFiLENo.: 18959
FILED: 04/24/97,16:27
RECEIVED BY: NL

RULE ANALYSIS
PURPOSE OF OR REASON FOR THIS FILING: AS a result of an

undetermined
discrepancy
of underlines and
strikethroughs between the codified rule at the Division of
Administrative Rules and what was thought to be a
codified copy at the Agency, some corrections were
required regarding the underlines and strikethroughs.
SUMMARY: Corrections are made at Sections R414-10A1, R414-10A-2, and R414-10A-4 through R414-10A-22.

R414.
Health, Health Care Financing, Coverage and
Reimbursement Policy.
R414-10A. Transplant Services Standards.
R414-10A-1. Introduction and Authority.
(1) This rule establishes standards and criteria for tissue
and organ transplantation services.
(2) [seteeted]Section 9507 of the federal Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA),
codified as section 1903(i)(l) of the Social Security Act,
requires states, as part of the Medicaid program, to establish
standards for coverage of transplantation services.
(3) Under the ruling issued by the Federal District Court
for the District of Utah, Central Division, Civil No. 96405,
the Department of Health has absolute discretion to fund
transplantation services under Title XTX of the Social Security
Act and if transplantation services are covered, there must be no discrimination on the basis of age.

STATE STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR

THIS FILING: Sections 26-1-5 and 26-18-1
FEDERAL MANDATE FOR THIS FILING:

Section 9507 of

Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
(COBRA) 1985, and Section 1903(i)(1) Social Security
Act (SSA)
ANTICIPATED COST OR SAVINGS TO:
• T H E STATE BUDGET: None.
•LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: None.
• O T H E R PERSONS: None.
COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR AFFECTED PERSONS: None.
THE FULL TEXT OF THIS FILING MAY BE INSPECTED, DURING
REGULAR BUSINESS HOURS, AT:

Health
Health
Care
Financing,
Reimbursement Policy
Cannon Health Building

Coverage

and

R414-10A-2. Definitions.
For purposes of R414-10A:
(1) "Abstinence" means the documented non-use of any
abusable psychoactive substance.
(2)
"Active infection" means current presumptive
evidence of invasion of tissue or body fluids by bacteria,
viruses, fungi, rickettsiae, or parasites which is not
demonstrated to be effectively controlled by the host, antibiotic
or antimicrobial agents.
(3) "Age group" means patients documented in the
medical literature with an age at the time of transplantation
related to the current age of the client as listed below:
(a) Birth through 12 months;
(b) One through 12 years;
(c) 13 through 20 years;
(d) 21 through 30 years;
(e) 31 through 40 years; or
(f) 41 through 54 years.
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(g) Department medical consultants may consider other
age groups, documented by the medical literature and the
transplant center to have conclusive relevance to the client's
survival.
(4) "Active substance abuse" means the current use of
any abusable psychoactive substance which is not appropriately
prescribed and taken under the direction of a physician or is
not medically indicated.
(5) "Allogenic" means having a different genetic
constitution but belonging to the same species.
(6) "Autologous" means the products or components of
the same individual person.
(7) "Client" means an individual eligible to receive
covered Medicaid services from an enrolled Medicaid
provider.
(8) "Department" means the Utah Department of Health.
(9)
"Emergency transplantation" means any
transplantation which for reasons of medical necessity requires
that a transplant be performed less than five days after
determination of the need for the [proccdure.clicnts
oflprocedure.
(10) "Intestine transplantation" means transplantation of
both the small bowel and colon.
(11) "Medical literature" means articles and medical
information which have been peer reviewed and accepted for
publication or published.
(12) "Medically necessary" means a client's medical
condition which meets all the criteria and none of the
contraindications
for the type of transplantation
f requested .hereby] requested.
(13) "Multiple transplantations" means, except for
corneas, the transplantation of more than one tissue or organ
during the same or different operative procedure.
(14)
"Multiviscerai transplantation" means the
transplantation of liver, pancreas, omentum, stomach, small
intestine and colon.
(15) "Patient" means a feHentlperson who is receiving
covered professional services provided or directed by a
licensed practitioner of the healing arts enrolled as a Medicaid
provider.
(16) "Remission" means the lack of any evidence of the
leukemia on physical examination and hematological
evaluation, including normocellular bone marrow with less
than five percent blast cells, and peripheral blood counts
within normal values, except for clients who are receiving
maintenance chemotherapy.
(17) "Services" means the type of medical assistance
specified in sections 1905(a)(1) through (24) of the Social
Security Act and interpreted in the 42 CFR Section 440,
Subpart A, October 1992 edition, which is adopted and
incorporated by reference.
(18) "Substance abuse rehabilitation program" means a
rehabilitation program developed and conducted by an
inpatient facility that, at a minimum, meets the standards of
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organization and staff of a chemical dependency/substance
abuse specialty hospital specified in R432-102-4.5.
(19) "Syngeneic" means possessing identical genotypes,
as monozygotic or identical twins.
(20) "Transplantation" means the transfer of a human
organ or tissue from one person to another or from one site to
another in the same individual, except for skin, tendon, and
bone.
(21) "Vital end-organs" means organs of the body
essential to life, e.g., the heart, the liver, the lungs, and the
brain.

R414-10A-4. Program Access Requirements.
(1) Transplantation services may be provided only for
those eligible clients who meet the criteria listed in R414-10A6 through 22 for services covered under the Utah Medicaid
program.
(2) Transplantation services for the organ needed by the
client may be provided only in a transplant center approved by
the United States Department of Health and Human Services
as a Medicare designated center or by the Department in
accordance with criteria in R414-10A-7.
(3) Transplantation services may be provided out-of-state
only when the authorized service is not available in an
approved facility in the state of Utah.
(4)
Criteria listed in R414-10A applicable to
transplantation services and transplant centers in the state of
Utah also apply to out-of-state transplant services and
facilities.
(5) Post transplant authorization for transplantation
services provided under unusual, emergency circumstances
may be given only when:
(a) all Utah Medicaid criteria listed in R414-10A-6
through 22 are met; and
(b) both the transplant center and the board-certifiedJQI
board-eligible specialist evaluation required by R414-10A-6 (3)
(0. (p)» (q)» and (r) are submitted with the recommendation
that the tissue or organ transplantation be authorized.
R414-10A-5. Service Coverage.
(1) Transplantation services are covered by the Utah
Medicaid program only when criteria listed in R414-10A-6
through 22 are met.
(2)
Transplantations which are experimental or
investigational or which are performed on an experimental or
investigational basis are not covered.
(3) Multiple transplantation services may be provided
only when the criteria for the specific multiple transplantations
are met.
(4) Staff shall not consider criteria for single tissue or
organ transplantation in reviewing requests for multiple
transplantations.
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(5) Transplantation of additional tissues or organs,
different from prior transplantations, may be provided only
when the criteria for multiple transplantations of all provided
or scheduled multiple tissue or organ transplantations are met.
(6) Repeat transplantations of the same tissues or organs
may be provided only when documentation reviewed by
Department staff and medical consultants shows that criteria
for transplantation of the specific tissues or organs are met.
([4]2) Emergency transplantations may be provided only
when the service is provided for a transplantation with criteria
approved in R414-10A-6 through 22. Payment will not be
made until Department staff has reviewed all of the
information required by R414-10A-6 through 22 and
determined that the patient and the transplant center met
criteria for approval and provision of the service at the time of
the transplantation.
R414-10A-6. Prior Authorization.
(1) Prior authorization is required for all transplantation
services except for cornea and kidney transplantation.
(2) The prior authorization request for transplantation
services must be initiated by the client's referring physician.
Failure to submit all required information with the prior
authorization request will delay processing of the request for
transplantation.
(3) The initial request for prior authorization of any
transplantation, except cornea or kidney, must contain all of
the following information and documentation:
(a) Request for Prior Authorization Form 24-06-37,
completed and signed by the physician.
(b) A description of the medical condition which
necessitates a transplantation.
(c) The client's prognosis, with and without a transplant,
including estimated life expectancy.
(d)
Transplantation treatment alternatives utilized
previous to the transplantation request.
(e) Transplantation treatment alternatives considered and
discarded, including discussion of why the alternatives have
been discarded.
(f)
Comprehensive examination, evaluation and
recommendations completed by a board-certified or boardeligible specialist in a field directly related to the client's
condition which necessitates the transplantation, such as a
nephrologist, gastroenterologist, cardiologist, or hematologist.
(g) Comprehensive psycho-social evaluation of the client
by a board-certified or board-eligible psychiatrist. The
evaluation must include a comprehensive history regarding
substance abuse and compliance with medical treatment.
(h) Psycho-social evaluation of parent(s) or guardian(s)
of the client, by a board-certified or board-eligible psychiatrist
if the client is less than 18 years of age. The psycho-social
evaluation must include a comprehensive history regarding
substance abuse, and past and present compliance with medical
treatment.
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(i) Comprehensive psychiatric evaluation of the client, if
the client has a history of mental illness.
(j) Comprehensive psychological or developmental
testing, as requested by the Department.
(k) Comprehensive infectious disease evaluation for a
client with a recent or current suspected infectious episode.
(1) Documentation by the client's referring physician that
a client with a history of substance abuse has successfully
completed a substance abuse program or has documented
abstinence for a period of at least six months before any
transplantation service can be authorized.
(m) Hospital and outpatient records for at least the last
two years, unless the patient is less than two years of age, in
which case all records.
(n) Any other medical evidence needed to evaluate
possible contraindications for the type of transplantation being
considered. Contraindications are listed in this rule under each
[selected jorgan or transplant type.
(o) The transplant center must document, by a current
medical literature review, a one-year survival rate ffoflfrom
patients having received transplantation for the age group,
specific diagnosis(es), condition and type of transplantation
proposed for the client. Survival rate must be calculated by
the Kaplan-Meier product-limit method or the actuarial life
table method: "Kaplan, G., Meier, P. Non-Parametric
estimation from incomplete observations. Journal of American
Statistical Association 53:457-481, 1958. Cox, D.R., Oakes,
D. Analysis of survival data. Chapman and Hill, 1984."
adopted and incorporated by reference. At least ten patients
in the appropriate age group must be alive at the end of the one
or three year period to document adequate confidence
intervals. The Department shall use independent research by
staff medical consultants to evaluate the documentation
submitted by the transplant center.
(p) The transplant center must document by a current
medical literature review, a one year graft function rate for
patients having received pancreas, kidney or small bowel
transplantation for the age group, specific diagnosis(es),
condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client.
Graft function rate must be calculated by the Kaplan-Meier
product-limit method or the actuarial life table method:
"Kaplan, G., Meier, P. Non-Parametric estimation from
incomplete observations. Journal of American Statistical
Association 53:457-481, 1958. Cox, D.R., Oakes, D.
Analysis of survival data. Chapman and Hill, 1984." adopted
and incorporated by reference. The time to graft failure will
be determined by the use of insulin post-pancreas
transplantation, by the use of dialysis post-renal
transplantation, and the use of total parenteral nutrition postsmall bowel transplantation. At least ten patients in the
appropriate age group must have documented graft function at
the end of the one year period to document adequate
confidence intervals. The Department shall use independent
research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the
documentation submitted by the transplant center.
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(q) Bone marrow transplantation centers must document,
by a current medical literature review, a one-year and a threeyear survival ratefrompatients having received transplantation
for the age group, specific diagnosis(es), condition and type of
transplantation proposed for the client. The Department shall
use independent research by staff medical consultants to
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
(r)
The transplant center must provide written
recommendations for each client which support the need for
the transplant. The recommendations must reflect use of both
the transplant center's own patient selection criteria and the
Utah Medicaid program criteria as noted in R414-10A-8
through 22. Agreement of the transplant center to provide the
required service must also be established.
(s) The physician must provide, for review by the
Department, any additional medical information which could
affect the outcome of the specific transplant being requested.
(t) The completed request for authorization, along with
all required information and documentation, must be delivered
to:
Utah Department of Health
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy
Utilization Management Unit
Transplant Coordinator
288 North 1460 West
Box 142904
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-2904
R414-10A-7. Criteria for Transplantation Centers or
Facilities.
Transplantation services are covered only in a transplant
center or facility which demonstrates the following
qualifications to the Department:
(1) Compliance with criteria listed in R414-10A-6
through 22.
(2)
The transplant center must document cost
effectiveness and quality of service. The transplant center
must complete, and submit to the Department for evaluation,
documentation specific to the surgical experience of the
requesting transplant center, showing applicable one and three
year survival rates for all patients receiving transplantation in
the last three years. The Department shall use independent
research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the
documentation submitted by the transplant center.
(3) Out-of-state transplant centers must meet all of the
criteria and requirements listed by the Department in R41410A-6 through 22.
(4) Transplantation services are covered in out-of-state
transplant centers only when the service is not available in an
approved facility in Utah, and agreement is reached between
the Department and the requesting physician that service outof-state is essential to the individual case.
(5) Reimbursement to out-of-state transplant centers is
provided only when the transplant center and the Department
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can agree upon arrangements which [reasonably ]conform to
the Department payment methodology.
(6) Corneal transplant facilities must document:
(a) certification or licensure by the Department as an
ambulatory surgical center or an acute care general hospital;
and
(b) that the surgeon is board-certified or board-eligible
in ophthalmology.
(7) Heart, kidney, and liver transplant centers must
document all of the following:
(a) Current approval by the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services as a Medicare-designated center for
transplantation of the organ needed by the client.
(b) Current full membership in the United Network for
Organ Sharing for the specific organ transplantation needed by
the client.
(8) Bone marrow transplant centers must document the
following:
(a) Approval to provide autologous or allogenic bone
marrow transplantation from at least one of the following:
(i) Children's Cancer Study Group approval as a bone
marrow transplantation center for autologous or allogenic bone
marrow.
(ii) Southwest Oncology Group approval as a bone
marrow transplantation center for autologous or allogenic bone
marrow.
(iii) National Marrow Donor Program approval as a bone
marrow transplantation center for allogenic bone marrow.
(b) Payment will be made for autologous bone marrow
transplantation services only if the transplantation center can
document approval by at least one of the agencies named in
R414-10A-7(l)through (7), and (8)(a)(i) or (ii) of this rule as
an approved autologous bone marrow transplantation center.
(c) Payment will be made for allogenic bone marrow
transplantation services only if the transplantation center can
document approval by at least one of the agencies named in
R414-10A-7(l)through (7), and(8)(a)(i) through (iii) of this
rule as an approved allogenic bone marrow transplant center.
(9) Lung transplant centers must have a current full
membership in the United Network for Organ Sharing for lung
transplantation.

R414-10A-9. Criteria and Contraindications for Bone
Marrow Transplantation.
(1) Bone marrow transplantation services may be
provided for a Medicaid eligible client of any age who meets
the following criteria.
(2) The client for bone marrow transplantation must meet
requirements of R414-10A-9(2)(a) or (b).
(a)
Allogenic and syngeneic bone marrow
transplantations may be approved for payment only when die
client has an HLA-matched donor. The donor must be
compatible for all or a five-out-of-six match of World Health
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Organization recognized HLA-A, -B, and -DR antigens as
determined by appropriate serologic typing methodology.
(i) A search of related family members, for a suitable
donor, is authorized for payment only after a written prior
authorization request has been received by the Department.
(ii) A search of unrelated persons by HLA-type, for a
suitable donor, will not be authorized for payment by the
Department until the client has been documented to meet all
other criteria in this rule for bone marrow transplantation
except an HLA-matched donor.
(iii) The transplant center staff must complete, and
submit to the Department for evaluation, a current medical
literature review, documenting a [maximumlminimum
probability of successful clinical outcome by having a greater
than or equal to 75 percent one-year survival rate, or by
having a greater than or equal to 55 percent three-year survival
rate or by meeting the one-year and three-year survival rates
for patients receiving bone marrow transplantation for the age
group, specific diagnosis(es), condition, and type of
transplantation proposed for the client. The Department shall
use independent research by staff medical consultants to
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
(b) Autologous bone marrow or peripheral blood stem
cell transplantation performed in conjunction with total body
radiation or high dose chemotherapy, may be approved for
payment only if a current medical literature review, completed
by the transplant center staff and sent to the Department for
staff
review
and
evaluation,
documenting
a
fmaximumlminimum probability of successful clinical outcome
by having a greater than or equal to 75 percent one-year
survival rate, or by having a greater than or equal to 55
percent three-year survival rate or by meeting the one-year and
three-year survival rates for patients receiving bone marrow
transplantation for the age group, specific diagnosis(es),
condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client.
The Department shall use independent research by staff
medical consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by
the transplant center.
(c) Clients for autologous bone marrow transplantations
must have adequate marrow function and no evidence of
marrow involvement by the primary malignancy at the time the
marrow is harvested.
(3) In addition to meeting the requirements of R414-10A9(2)(a) or (b), the client for bone marrow transplantation must
meet the requirements of at least R414-10A-9(3)(a) or (b).
(a) The client must have irreversible, progressive bone
marrow disease with a life expectancy of one year or less
without transplantation or must have greater than a five year
increase in life expectancy with transplantation, with no other
reasonable medical or surgical alternative to transplantation
available.
(b) The transplant center staff must complete, and submit
to the Department for staff review and evaluation, a medical
literature review documenting that the client's condition will
cause irreversible, progressive disease to vital end-organs
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within two years following the application for transplant and
have no other reasonable medical or surgical alternative to
transplantation available. The medical literature must also
document that the bone marrow transplantation will prevent
irreversible, progressive disease to the client's vital end-organs
and must document that it will increase the life expectancy of
the client by greater than five years. The Department shall use
independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate
the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
(4) In addition to meeting the requirements listed in
R414-10A-9, (1) through (3), the client must meet all of the
following requirements:
(a) Medical assessment that the client is a reasonable risk
for surgery with a likelihood of tolerance for
immunosuppressive therapy.
(b) Medical assessment by the client's referring physician
that the client has sufficient mental, emotional and social
stability and support to ensure that Ihelthe client and [his
]parent(s) or guardian(s) will strictly adhere to the long-term
follow-up and the immunosuppressive program which is
required.
(c) Psycho-social assessment by a board-certified or
board-eligible psychiatrist that the client has sufficient mental,
emotional and social stability and support to ensure that fhelthe
client and [h«-]parent(s) or guardian(s) will strictly adhere to
the long-term follow-up and the immunosuppressive program
which is required.
(d) The client must have a strong motivation to undergo
the procedure as documented by the medical and psycho-social
assessment.
(e) If the client has a history of substance abuse, then the
client must successfully complete a substance abuse
rehabilitation program or must have documented abstinence for
a period of at least six months before the Department reviews
a request for transplantation services.
(f) A current medical literature review, completed by the
transplant center staff and submitted to the Department for
staff review and evaluation, documenting that the underlying
original bone marrow disease will not recur and limit survival
to less than 75% one-year survival rate, or to less than 55%
three-year survival rate.
The Department shall use
independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate
the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
(5) Any single contraindication listed below precludes
approval for Medicaid payment for bone marrow
transplantation:
(a) Active infection.
(b) Acute severe hemodynamic compromise at the time
of transplantation if accompanied by significant compromise of
one or more vital end-organs.
(c) Active substance abuse.
(d) Presence of systemic dysfunction or malignant
disease which could limit successful clinical outcome or
interfere with compliance with a disciplined medical regimen
or rehabilitation after transplantation.
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(e) Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) antibody
positive.
(f) Neuropsychiatry disorder which could lead to noncompliance or inhibit rehabilitation of the patient.
(g) Pulmonary diseases:
(i) Cystic fibrosis.
(ii) Obstructive pulmonary disease (FEV1 less than 50%
of predict[ftWe]ejl).
(iii) Restrictive pulmonary disease (FVC less than 50%
of predict[«We]eiD.
(iv)
Unresolved pulmonary roentgenographic
abnormalities of unclear etiology.
(v) Recent or unresolved pulmonary infarction.
(h) Cancer, unless treated and eradicated for two or more
years or unless a current medical literature review, completed
by the transplant center staff and submitted to the Department
for staff review and evaluation, documents a greater than or
equal to 75% one-year survival rate, or a greater than or equal
to 55 percent three-year survival rate, or by meeting the oneyear and three-year survival rates after transplantation for the
age group, specific cancer, diagnosis(es), condition, and type
of transplantation proposed for the client. The Department
shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
(i) Cardiovascular diseases:
(i) Intractable cardiap arrhythmias,
(ii) Symptomatic or occlusive peripheral vascular or
cerebrovascular disease.
(iii) Severe generalized arteriosclerosis.
(j) Evidence of other major organ system disease or
anomaly which could decrease the probability of successful
clinical outcome or decrease the potential for rehabilitation.
(k) Behavior pattern documented in the client's medical
or psycho-social assessment which could interfere with a
disciplined medical regimen. An indication of non-compliance
by the client is documented by any of the following:
(i) Non-compliance with medications or therapy.
(ii) Failure to keep scheduled appointments.
(iii) Leaving the hospital against medical advice.
(iv) Active substance abuse.
(6) Prior to the approval of transplantation, the
transplantation team must document a plan of care, agreed to
by the parent(s) or guardian(s) of a client who is under 18
years of age, to assure compliance to medication and follow-up
care, if an indication of non-compliance documented by any of
the behaviors listed in R414-10A-9(5)(k)(i) through (iv) is
demonstrated by the parent(s) or guardian(s) of the client.
R414-10A-10. Criteria and Contraindications for Heart
Transplantation.
(1) Heart transplantation services may be provided for a
Medicaid eligible client of any age who meets the following
criteria.
(2) The client for heart transplantation must meet
requirements of at least R414-10A-10(2)(a) or (b).
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(a) The client must have irreversible, progressive heart
disease, with a life expectancy of one year or less, or
documented evidence of progressive pulmonary hypertension,
and with no other reasonable medical or surgical alternative to
transplantation available.
(b) The transplant center staff must complete, and submit
to the Department for staff review and evaluation, a medical
literature review documenting that the client's condition will
cause irreversible, progressive disease to vital end-organs
within two years following the application for transplant and
have no other reasonable medical or surgical alternative to
transplantation available. The medical literature must also
document that the heart transplantation will prevent
irreversible, progressive disease to the client's vital end-organs
and must document that it will increase the life expectancy of
the client by greater than five years. The Department shall use
independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate
the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
(3) In addition to meeting at least one of the requirements
listed in R414-10A-10(2), the client must meet all of the
following requirements:
(a) The transplant center staff must complete, and submit
to the Department for staff review and evaluation, a current
[published—]medical literature review documenting a
probability of successful clinical outcome by having a greater
than or equal to 75 percent one-year survival rate for patients
receiving heart transplantation for the age group, specific
diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed
for the client. The Department shall use independent research
by staff medical consultants to evaluate the documentation
submitted by the transplant center.
(b) Severe cardiac dysfunction.
(c) Medical assessment [by the client's referring
physician ]that the client is a reasonable risk for surgery with
a likelihood of tolerance for immunosuppressive therapy.
(d) Medical assessment by the client's referring physician
that the client has sufficient mental, emotional and social
stability and support to ensure that the client and parent(s) or
guardian(s) will strictly adhere to the long-term follow-up and
the immunosuppressive program which is required.
(e) Psycho-social assessment by a board-certified or
board-eligible psychiatrist that the client has sufficient mental,
emotional and social stability and support to ensure that the
client and parent(s) or guardian(s) will strictly adhere to the
long-term follow-up and the immunosuppressive program
which is required.
(f) The client must have strong motivation to undergo the
procedure, as documented by the medical and psycho-social
assessment.
(g) If the client has a history of substance abuse, then the
client must successfully complete a substance abuse
rehabilitation program or must have documented abstinence for
a period of at least six months before the Department reviews
a request for transplantation services.
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